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General Principles of Procedural Law and 
Procedural Jus Cogens 
S.I. Strong*
ABSTRACT 
General principles of law have long been central to the practice and 
scholarship of both public and private international law. However, the 
vast majority of commentary focuses on substantive rather than 
procedural concerns. This Article reverses that trend through a unique 
and innovative analysis that provides judges, practitioners, and 
academics from around the world with a new perspective on international 
procedural law. 
The Article begins by considering how general principles of 
procedural law (international due process) are developed under both 
contemporary and classic models and evaluates the propriety of relying 
on materials generated from international arbitration when seeking to 
identify the nature, scope, and content of general principles of procedural 
law. The analysis adopts both a forward-looking, jurisprudential 
perspective as well as a backward-looking, content-based one and 
compares sources and standards generated by international arbitration to 
those derived from other fields, including transnational litigation, 
international human rights, and the rule of law. 
The Article then tackles the novel question of whether general 
principles of procedural law can be used to develop a procedural form of 
}us cogens (peremptory norms). Although commentators have hinted at 
the possible existence of a procedural aspect of }us co gens, no one has 
yet focused on that precise issue. However, recent events, including 
those at the International Court of Justice and in various domestic 
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V. CONCLUSION ·································· ...................................................... 403 I. INTRODUCTION"General principles of law" have long been central to thedevelopment and practice of both public and private international law.1For example, state parties have consented to the application of general principles of substantive and procedural law in matters submitted to the International Court of Justice since 1945,2 while· private parties have 1. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l )(c), June 26, 1945,2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 6 at 75. The International Court of Justice was founded in 1945 as part of the United Nations. See U.N. Charter art. 92. 2. The Statute for the International Court of Justice states:1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international lawsuch disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishingrules expressly recognized by the contesting states;b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
routinely relied on general principles of commercial law (traditionally
referred to as lex mercatoria and now largely codified in the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts) to resolve their
business disputes.
As enduring and accepted as these practices may be, problems
nevertheless exist. For example, most discussions about the content and
use of general principles of law focus on matters of substance rather than
procedure, even though "[p]rocedure is an instrument of power that can,
in a very practical sense, generate or undermine substantive rights."0
Furthermore, the usefulness of those procedural analyses that do exist is
often diluted due to vague, varied, and variable terminology, which can
encompass everything from "international due process," "procedural
fairness," and "natural justice" to "lex proceduralia" (the procedural
equivalent of lex mercatoria) and the all-encompassing phrase, "general
principles of law."5
Some of these difficulties can be explained by the fact that
procedural due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," 6 but is instead a flexible concept that "calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."7 As a result,
"theories of procedural justice are," as both Robert Bone and Lawrence
Solum have argued, "thinly developed," even though "[q]uestions about
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1, art. 38(1)(c).
3. See INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2016), http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/principles2016/principles20l6-e.pdf; 2 GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2660 (2d ed. 2014). See generally KLAUS
PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed.
2010); ORSOLYA TOTH, THE LEX MERCATORIA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2017);
Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision
Making?, 17 ARB. INT'L 59 (2001).
4. Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 801, 802 (2010).
5. See MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1st ed. 2005); MATTI S. KURKELA, SANTTU TURUNEN &
CONFLICT MGMT. INST., DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11
(2d ed. 2010); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1321-22 (2003).
6. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
7. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
2018] 349
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
procedural justice are remarkably persistent." 8 Concerns about under-
theorization are particularly pronounced in the area of international
procedure.9
The longstanding neglect of international procedural law does not
mean that such matters are unimportant.'o To the contrary, recent events
suggest a heightened need to reconsider the place of procedure in the
pantheon of international law. For example, the International Court of
Justice's decision in Germany v. Italy" recently triggered a widespread
international debate about the connection between state immunity
(commonly characterized as a procedural matter) and various substantive
norms of international law. 12
Few people would question the relevance of international
procedural law to international judicial proceedings. However,
international procedural law may also have a role to play in certain types
of national court proceedings. 13
8. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 182-83 (2004)
(writing in the domestic context); see also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process:
The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485,
488-89 (2003). Procedural due process has long been considered a critical component of
U.S. constitutional law. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 547 (3d ed. 2006) ("The concept of procedural due process has never been
controversial."); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in
the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 140 (2011) (defining procedural due process
as "a bedrock feature of [the U.S.] legal system" and claiming that it refers to "the
appropriate level of procedural safeguards that must be in place to ensure a fair legal
process" (citations omitted)); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044, 1044 (1984) (suggesting that procedural due process is the
oldest of the various civil rights).
9. Scholarly analysis of international procedural law is extremely uneven. See, e.g.,
Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 416 (1999) ("Compared with choice of law
and jurisdiction, the recognition of judgments is a scholarly desert."). U.S. legal
scholarship in this field is particularly lacking. See Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating
Transnational Perspectives into Civil Procedure: What Not to Teach, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.
524, 530 (2006) (discussing "the parochialism that so affects U.S. procedure"); John H.
Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 545, 546 (1995); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism
into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709 (2005) ("American proceduralists
have not been comparativists."); id. at 740 ("The problem in the U.S. is that comparative
procedure is barely on the map.").
10. See Solum, supra note 8, at 182-83.
11. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep.
99 (Feb. 3).
12. See id. paras. 45-47; S6vrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus
Cogens, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 149, 154-56 (2011); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The
Classification ofInternational Legal Rules: A Reply to Stefan Talmon, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 89, 89-90 (2013); Stefan Talmon, Jus Cogens After Germany v. Italy: Substantive and
Procedural Rules Distinguished, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 979, 979-80 (2012).
13. See Jenny S. Martinez, Who's Afraid of International and Foreign Law?, 104
CALIF. L. REv. 1579, 1584 (2016).
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This latter assertion may appear contrary to the "strain of
isolationism [that] runs deep" in certain national political systems.14
However, Jenny Martinez has recognized that "[e]ven the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, who argued so vociferously against the use of foreign
law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, agreed that consideration of
foreign sources was relevant to the interpretation of multilateral treaties
and to conflict-of-law questions.""
One potentially important type of international law that falls into
this accepted category of cases involves certain peremptory (non-
derogable) norms referred to as jus cogens.16 These norms, which can
operate in the realm of individual rights, have been defined as a type of
conflict of laws provision and thus could apply to domestic
proceedings. 17 While jus cogens has not yet been discussed in the context
of national judicial procedures, some areas of concern already exist. For
example, U.S. courts and commentators have raised questions about
derogations of procedural rights in certain types of civil disputes based
on claims of political expediency, 18 while British jurists have struggled to
justify the United Kingdom's reversal of an 800-year-old prohibition on
double jeopardy.19
14. See id. at 1585 (noting "that strain resists engagement with the world ... in
ways both mundane and frightening").
15. Id. at 1584.
16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Evan J. Criddle &
Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 332
(2009).
17. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
53 (2006); Sue S. Guan, Jus Cogens: To Revise a Narrative, 26 MINN. J. INT'L L. 461,
496 (2017); Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and Other Rules-
The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 21, 26
(Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
18. Political expediency has been used to explain or justify a wide range of
procedural due process violations in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Amy Volz & Deborah Anker,
The Impact of President Trump's Executive Orders on Asylum Seekers, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, May 2017, at 1; Micab Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of
Terrorism? Procedural Due Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 685, 687-88 (2002) (discussing procedural concerns generated by the World
War II cases on Japanese internment and contemporary disputes arising out of the Bush
Administration's war on terror); Erik Larson & Kartikay Mehrotra, Trump's Immigration
Crackdown is Likely to Bring a Flood of Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2017, 8:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-22/trump-s-immigration-
crackdown-likely-to-bring-lawsuit-flood (discussing procedural concerns in immigration
cases).
19. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 75 (Eng. & Wales); Double Jeopardy
(Scotland) Act 2011, (ASP 16) §§ 1-4; HM Advocate v. Sinclair (2014) HCJAC 121,
[97]-[104] (Scot.); Gerard Coffey, The Constitutional Status of the Double Jeopardy
Principle, 30 DUBLIN U. L.J. 138, 138 (2008); Peter W. Ferguson, Double Jeopardy,
2018] 351
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As important as these issues are, scholars have seldom sought to
address concerns about international procedural law on a holistic basis.
One important exception was Bin Cheng, whose classic 1953 work,
General Principles of Law As Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals, analyzed the practical applications of the term "general
principles of law" in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice in the years immediately following the creation of the
court.20 Cheng's work was critical in shaping international consensus
regarding both the content of general principles of law and the means by
which such principles are to be derived. 2 1 However, much has happened
in the 65 years since he wrote, and questions have begun to arise about
the continuing relevance of Cheng's work.22
Cheng's work has recently returned to the limelight as the result of
a book-length work by Charles Kotuby and Luke Sobota that seeks to
update Cheng's analysis.23 Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota devote
considerable time and energy to content-based discussions about general
principles of procedural law and make an invaluable contribution to the
literature for that reason alone.24 However, these authors also provide
important insights into the methodology of international law as a result
of their explicit and somewhat innovative decision to rely on authorities
involving international arbitration when developing general principles of
procedural law.2 5
2009 ScoT. CRIM. L. 669, 678-79; David Hamer, The Expectation ofIncorrect Acquittals
and the "New and Compelling Evidence" Exception to Double Jeopardy, 2 CRIM. L. REV.
63, 78 (2009); Double Jeopardy Law Ushered Out, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/4406129.stm.
20. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1, art. 38(1)(c). See
generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953).
21. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of
International Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768, 770 (1990); Jaye Ellis, General Principles
and Comparative Law, 22 EuR. J. INT'L L. 949, 956 n.29 (2011); Robert D. Sloane,
Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Regulation of Nationality,
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 19 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 21, at 970-71 (suggesting a new methodological
approach to the identification of general principles of law is in order).
23. See CHARLES T. KOTUBY, JR. & LUKE A. SOBOTA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND NORMs APPLICABLE - IN
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES xiii, 157-202 (2017). -
24. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202. The authors also discuss general principles of law from a substantive
perspective. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 29-253; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
87-155.
25. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 23 (relying on nearly 600 decisions from
international arbitral and judicial tribunals and citing materials as far back as the Jay
Treaty of 1794); KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at xiii. Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota
all appear to include all types of arbitration-interstate, international commercial, and
investor-state (investment)--in their analyses. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 29-30, 33-
[Vol. 122:2352
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Kotuby and Sobota's decision to refer to arbitral materials may not
seem that striking given the pervasive nature of international arbitration
26reiesaitc arin contemporary law and practice. Although precise statistics are
difficult to obtain, some commentators suggest that up to 90 percent of
all international commercial contracts currently include an arbitration
27 - * * *provision, with similar mechanisms in place in approximately 93
percent of the 3,000-5,000 interstate investment treaties (including both
multilateral investment treaties (MITs) and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs)) now in effect.28 Well over 5,000 international arbitrations are
filed per year,29 which strongly suggests that arbitration is by far the
preferred means of resolving cross-border commercial, investment, and
interstate disputes. 3 0 This phenomenon has led several commentators,
most notably Gary Born, to characterize international arbitration as the
"second generation" of international adjudication, following the first
wave of permanent adjudicatory bodies such as the International Court of
Justice and the International Criminal Court.3 1
When viewed in this light, Kotuby and Sobota's methodological
approach does not appear particularly noteworthy. 32 However, the recent
34, 55-56, 61 (referring to commercial treaties); KOTUaY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
35-37 (referring to international commercial arbitration). This Article adopts the same
approach, both for ease of discussion and because all three types of arbitration include a
grant of jurisdiction from the state that reflects a formal connection between the
proceeding and the state. See S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 US.C. § 1782:
Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment
Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 331-50 (2013).
26. See KoTuBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2.
27. See Otto Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and
Arbitration Clauses: European Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 7, 37 (2009).
28. See ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 5, 9 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf, S.I.
Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of "Regulatory Arbitration "-Abaclat v. Argentine
Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 300 n.271 (2013).
29. Most arbitrations involve international commercial disputes, but 20 to 50
investment arbitrations are filed each year. See U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, IIA Issues Note: Recent Trends in HAS and ISDS, at 1 (Feb. 2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015dl_en.pdf (stating "claimants
filed 42 known treaty-based ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] cases" in 2014);
Gary Born, A New Generation ofInternational Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 830, 839
(2012) (noting the lack of numerical precision comes from the confidential nature of
international arbitration).
30. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 93, 97.
31. Born, supra note 29, at 819; see also Diane A. Desierto, Rawlsian Fairness and
International Arbitration, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 939, 948 (2015); Martinez, supra note 13,
at 1579 n.2.
32. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2. Other contemporary commentators
have also used this approach. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION xxviii-xxix, xxx-xxxi, xxxvii-xxxviii (2007) (citing arbitral decisions
involving the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the
2018] 353
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proliferation of international arbitration cannot be used to explain
Cheng's analytical framework, since neither international commercial
arbitration nor investment arbitration was in vogue in 1953, when Cheng
wrote his commentary.3 To the contrary, Cheng's analysis predates the
1958 adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), the
leading international treaty on international commercial arbitration,34 as
well as the massive increase in BITs and MITs that began in the late
1980s and 1990s. 3 5
Georg Schwarzenberger was one of the few contemporary
commentators to recognize the importance and validity of Cheng's
methodological approach at the time Cheng's book was published.36
According to Schwarzenberger, "Dr. Cheng has broken new ground in
Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
and other arbitral tribunals); THOMAS WEATHERALL, Jus COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND SOCIAL CONTRACT xxii-xxiii (2015) (noting reliance on various arbitral sources);
Desierto, supra note 31, at 948; Alan Nissel, The Duality of State Responsibility, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 793, 795-96 (2013); S.I. Strong, Limits ofProcedural Choice
ofLaw, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1083 (2014).
33. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257 (framing his procedural discussion as
involving "general principles of law in judicial proceedings" but using the Greco-
Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the Arakas (The Georgios) Case (1927) as his
primary exemplar); see also 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 99, 120.
34. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html (last visited July 14, 2017)
[hereinafter New York Convention Status] (listing 157 states as parties). Although the
New York Convention is the most important treaty involving enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards and agreements, a number of other instruments also exist. See generally
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87; Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42; European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364.
35. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 122. The thousands of BITs in existence do not
follow a single pattern, although there are model BITs that provide a degree of
consistency in the field. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. Dep't of State (2004), https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/I 17601.pdf. The most important of the multilateral treaties is the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, more commonly known as the ICSID Convention. See generally
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1720, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]; 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 120.
36. Schwarzenberger can be counted among the giants of 20th century international
law. See Robert Cryer, International Law and the Illusion of Novelty: Georg
Schwarzenberger, in BRITISH INFLUENCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1915-2015 458, 462
(Robert McCorquodale & Jean-Pierre Gauci eds., 2016)
354 [Vol. 122:2
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
exploring the practice of international arbitration and has shown that
international judicial institutions other than the World Court have found
it necessary to have recourse on a much larger scale to this subsidiary
source of international law," meaning the law relating to international
arbitration. Remarkably, this aspect of Cheng's contribution to
international law has been largely ignored by the scholarly community.3 8
It is unclear whether Kotuby and Sobota will benefit from a similar
level of benign neglect given recent attacks on the legitimacy of
international arbitration. 39 To the contrary, critics could claim that the
use of dubious source materials (i.e., those relating to international
arbitration) during the norm-generation process calls into question the
validity of Kotuby and Sobota's conclusions.4 0 If, however, the use of
arbitral materials can be justified from a methodological perspective,
then any recommendations that are generated from those materials
41become more difficult to challenge.
This Article, therefore, considers whether and to what extent it is
appropriate to consider authorities derived from international arbitration
when determining the scope and nature of general principles of
procedural law. This analysis is extremely important to anyone, be they
court or commentator, in the United States or abroad, who seeks to
evaluate the validity of Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota's conclusions about
the content of general principles of procedural law.42 Although this
37. Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreword to CHENG, supra note 20, at xi, xii.
38. See generally CHENG, supra note 20.
39. While most of the criticism has been aimed at investment arbitration,
international commercial arbitration has occasionally been targeted as well. See 1 BORN,
supra note 3, at 250; Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID's Legitimacy Debate: Towards a
Goal-Based Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 465, 468-69 (2013) (citing
authorities); S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky Defaults, Status Quo
Bias and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of International
Arbitration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (citing authorities). See generally
HALEY SWEETLAND EDWARDS, SHADOW COURTS: THE TRIBUNALS THAT RULE GLOBAL
TRADE (2016); THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel et
al. eds., 2010).
40. See Ellis, supra note 21, at 956. The choice of source materials can significantly
alter the outcome of any critical analysis. See Walter D. Johnson & Edward L. Sattler,
The Importance of the Selection Process in Maintaining Expert Credibility: A Guideline
for Choosing the Economist, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 3, 3 (1992); Philip M. Podsakoff et al.,
Sources of Method Bias in Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to
Control It, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 539, 546 (2012).
41. See Johnson & Sattler, supra note 40, at 3. For example, Nikolaos Lavranos has
objected to Chester Brown's effort to identify common procedural principles across
different types of international adjudication based on the notion that procedural diversity
is preferable to procedural consistency. See Nikolaos Lavranos, Chester Brown. A
Common Law of International Adjudication, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 230, 230-33 (2009)
(book review).
42. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202.
2018] 355
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Article focuses exclusively on issues of procedural law, the
methodological inquiry is equally valuable to those considering the
propriety of Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota's conclusions about general
principles of substantive law, since the means of deriving those
principles is the same, regardless of whether the issue is procedural or
substantive in nature.43
As important as that discussion is, this Article seeks to do more than
simply evaluate the propriety of Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota's analytical
methods and conclusions.44 Instead, the discussion takes the inquiry to
the next level by considering whether and to what extent the general
principles of procedural law developed by these three commentators
might reflect the existence or content of what might be referred to as
procedural jus cogens.45 This issue has not yet been addressed in the
legal literature, despite an acknowledged need for a better understanding
of the theoretical aspects of international procedural law.46 Not only
would recognition of a procedural aspect of jus cogens affect
proceedings in international courts, as in cases like Germany v. Italy,47 it
could also have important ramifications for domestic courts, both inside
and outside the United States, to the extent those courts seek to violate
certain non-derogable principles of procedural law.4 8
43. Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota spend a considerable amount of time discussing the
substantive aspects of general principles of law. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 29-253;
KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 3-54, 87-155. However, this Article does not
address those issues, in part because "[t]he resolution of [substantive] inter-state disputes
is most often based on other recognised sources of international law such as treaty and
custom rather than on general principles of law." Gbenga Bamodu, Extra-National Legal
Principles in the Global Village: A Conceptual Examination of Transnational Law, 4
INT'L ARB. L. REv. 6, 15 n.73 (2001); see also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of
"General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279,
279 (1963); Roy M. Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law,
46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 16-17 (1997).
44. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202.
45. See infra notes 243-59 and accompanying text (defining jus cogens and
distinguishing it from other types of public international law, including customary
international law, general principles of law, and obligations erga omnes).
46. A few commentators have discussed ancillary issues, but nothing has been
found on this particular issue. See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to
Justice Under Customary International Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1,
2 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) (considering whether violation of a substantive 'jus
cogens norm create[s] a corresponding non-derogable right of access to justice");
Orakhelashvili, supra note 12, at 89-90 (discussing whether certain substantive norms
should take priority over various procedural rules in cases involving state immunity);
Talmon, supra note 12, at 980-81 (same).
47. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J.
Rep. 99, paras. 45-47 (Feb. 3).
48. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 338-55 and
accompanying text.
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The Article proceeds as follows: First, Part II discusses sources and
strategies relating to the development of general principles of procedural
law and describes how reliance on sources generated from international
arbitration can be justified as a matter of both theory and practice. Next,
Part III considers how to derive the content of general principles of
procedural law and describes why that process must rely on arbitral
authorities if the outcome is to be sufficiently precise and complete.
Having established the propriety of Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota's
methodological approach, the Article then turns in Part IV to the novel
issue of whether and to what extent any of the general principles of
procedural law described by the three jurists rise to the level of
procedural jus cogens.4 9 Part V concludes the Article by tying together
the various strands of discussion and providing some forward-looking
proposals relating to this area of law.
Before beginning, it is useful to clarify two points. First, the terms
"international due process" and "general principles of procedural law"
are used synonymously in this Article. Although commentators
occasionally use other language to describe the relevant concepts, these
two phrases appear to be the most popular and will be used
interchangeably.o Second, this Article focuses exclusively on procedures
associated with civil proceedings rather than criminal proceedings. While
analysis of international criminal procedure is to some extent more
advanced than international civil procedure, Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota
focus virtually exclusively on civil proceedings, making it appropriate to
adopt the same approach here.
49. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202; see also infra Part IV.
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51. See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 1-17 (2011) (suggesting
domestic due process standards regarding habeas corpus should be extended to
international law and recognized as jus cogens); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach
Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEo. L.J. 683, 714-15 (2006); Richard Volger,
Due Process, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 930,
930 (2012). Kotuby and Sobota have one passing reference to criminal law in their text,
while Cheng appears to avoid the issue altogether. See CHENG, supra note 20; KOTUBY &
SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 49.
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II.. SOURCES AND STRATEGIES RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
A. Source Material Relevant to the Development of General
Principles ofProcedural Law
When seeking to determine the content of general principles of law,
it is first necessary to identify the sources from which those principles
will be derived.52 According to Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota, that process
begins by considering the procedural protections contained within
various international treaties. 53 Not every international instrument is
equally relevant to this particular task, but it is necessary to compare
principles derived from a variety of different settings so as to ensure
54.
accurate conclusions.
Initially, it might seem best to begin the analysis by focusing on
international treaties involving cross-border litigation, since courts would
likely grant those instruments heightened regard as a type of lex
specialis." The problem is that there are actually very few international
instruments involving procedural rights per se,56 and those that do exist
are either not very detailed or not widely adopted. 7 For example, the
52. See Ellis, supra note 21, at 954.
53. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 1, 23, 26; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
61.
54. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 1, 23, 26; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
61. For example, general principles of procedural law have been tied to the rule of law
and international human rights as well as recognition of foreign judgments and foreign
arbitral awards. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 10-23; ALEKSANDAR JAKSIC, ARBITRATION
AND HuMAN RIGHTS 218 (2002); KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 71-73.
55. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 71-73 (suggesting the relevance of
authorities involving recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments); Bruno Simma
& Dirk Pulkowski, OfPlanets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International
Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 483, 487 (2006) ("The rule lex specialis derogat legi generali
has been referred to as a well-recognized principle of international law.").
56. For example, the Hague Conventions on service and evidence are not really
applicable to this analysis, since they do not discuss procedural minimums but instead
simply facilitate certain cross-border activities. See generally Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970,
23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
658 U.N.T.S. 163. Similarly, the Montevideo Treaty on International Procedural Law
(1889, amended 1940) simply formalized the notion that trials (including those involving
the enforcement of arbitral awards (fallos arbitrales)) should follow the procedure of the
place where the action, is. brought. See Ana Delid, The Birth of Modern Private
International Law: The Treaties of Montevideo (1889, amended 1940), OXFORD PUB.
INT'L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/Treaties-Montevideo (last visited Dec. 7, 2017);
see also Strong, supra note 32, at 1030 (questioning whether that principle may be
overcome by contract).
57. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 79 (noting "there is no global counterpart to the
New York Convention for foreign judgments"). Some success has been achieved on the
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Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (COCA) incorporates some
procedural standards, but only in the most general of terms, stating in
Article 9 that
Recognition or enforcement [of a foreign judgment] may be refused if -
c) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim,
i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as
to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant entered an
appearance and presented his case without contesting notification in the
court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted
notification to be contested; or
ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that is
incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested State
concerning service of documents;
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of
procedure;
e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with
the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State ... .
Although these concepts are certainly relevant to the current
inquiry, they are not as comprehensive as inquiries generated from other
areas of law.59 COCA's relevance is further diminished by the fact that it
has only recently come into force and has only a very small number of
states parties construing what are relatively general provisions. 60 As a
result, COCA may not reflect a sufficiently high degree of state
consensus on basic procedural principles.
regional level, particularly within the European Union. See Regulation (EU) No.
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, recast, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1; Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of
Authentic Instruments in Matters of Succession and on the Creation of a European
Certificate of Succession, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 107; Council Regulation (EC) No.
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental
Responsibility, Repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000, 2001 O.J. (L 338); Council
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
58. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 9, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294 (entered into force Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter COCA].
59. See infra notes 75-122 and accompanying text.
60. See COCA, supra note 58, at art. 9.
61. See id.
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Some insight could perhaps be gleaned from a proposed convention
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that is being
drafted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.62
However, that project has been underway for several decades in one form
or another, and it is by no means clear whether the most recent iteration
will be successful.6 3
These problems suggest that treaties concerning cross-border
litigation may not be the best source of material from which to generate
general principles of procedural law. The next most promising alternative
involves instruments concerning international human rights, which often
include protections relating to adjudicative procedures. 4 For example,
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Universal Declaration), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention), and the American Convention on
Human Rights all include language describing procedural protections in
civil proceedings. 6 5 Although these instruments have been widely
adopted by numerous countries around the world and have indeed been
referred to as reflecting the "international constitutional order," they
experience the same types of difficulties as COCA in that they are
relatively general and insufficiently comprehensive.66 For example,
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration states only that "[e]veryone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
62. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judginents (last visited Dec. 7,
2017).
63. See id
64. See Gates Garrity-Rokous & Raymond H. Brescia, Procedural Justice and
International Human Rights: Towards a Procedural Jurisprudence for Human Rights
Tribunals, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 566-71 (1993) (discussing due process limitations on
the exercise of political considerations in the area of procedure). These documents were
primarily promulgated in the years after the publication of Cheng's original text and are
therefore only discussed by later commentators such as Kotuby and Sobota. See CHENG,
supra note 20; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 61, 69; see also Strong, supra note
32, at 1091-92.
65. See American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica" art.
8, para. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, para. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 art. 6, para. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
66. Petra Butler, Red Riding Hood-Is Investor-State Arbitration the Big Bad
Wolf, 5 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 328, 334-35 (2017); see also COCA, supra note 58,
at art. 9; Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 749, 749-58 (2008).
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and of any criminal charge against him." 67 Article 14 of the ICCPR is
somewhat more detailed, although most of that article refers to criminal
rather than civil proceedings.68 Indeed, the civil aspects of Article 14
simply state that
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination ... of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of
morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic
society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law
shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or
the guardianship of children ... 69
One major problem with human rights law involves the relative
scarcity of judicial decisions construing the relevant provisions.
Although various organs of the United Nations, including the Human
Rights Committee, can and often do issue various soft law guidelines
regarding the interpretation of these instruments, many human rights
documents are considered non-binding and "aspirational" in nature,
which means they are not often subjected to litigation that could clarify
ambiguous treaty language. ' The one exception is Article 6 of the
European Convention, which has been cited so frequently (more than
28,000 times) by the European. Court of Human Rights (European Court)
that it has become the subject of two special guides written and published
by the European Court: one dealing with civil procedure and one dealing
with criminal procedure.7 2 Unfortunately, the regional nature of the
67. Universal Declaration, supra note 65, at art. 10.
68. See ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 14.
69. Id. at art. 14, para. 1.
70. See Human Rights Treaty Bodies-General Comments, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS,
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/
TBGeneralComments.aspx (last visited July 14, 2017).
71. See Oona Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 260, 278, 319-20 (2013) (discussing U.S. adherence to, including
conditions attached to, the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR as well as the
aspirational nature of the international human rights regime); Harold Hongju Koh, How
Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1398 (1999).
72. See European Convention, supra note 65, at art. 6, para. 1; EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS-RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CIVIL LImB) (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/GuideArt_6_ENG.pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN COURT, CIVIL LIMB];
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European Convention means that the text and the opinions of the
European Court cannot be guaranteed to reflect global norms, even
though many of the procedural protections reflected in the European
Convention are the same or similar to other, more widely adopted
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration and the
ICCPR.73 Difficulties also arise because scholarly analysis of Article 6 in
civil proceedings is still relatively undeveloped in comparison to the
commentary concerning criminal proceedings.74
The situation would be dire indeed if these were the only two types
of treaties that could be considered. However, Cheng, Kotuby, and
Sobota all believed that it was both possible and prudent to supplement
their analysis by considering procedural standards in international
arbitration.7 5
On first glance, this methodological decision may seem somewhat
controversial. For example, some people have questioned the legitimacy
of international arbitration based on the assumption that arbitration
constitutes a "lesser" form of civil justice because parties are allowed to
waive certain procedural protections that would be required in court.76
Many, if not all, of these concerns have been answered by numerous
empirical studies demonstrating that international arbitration is a fair and
objective means of resolving international commercial and investment
disputes, and by routine suggestions by both courts and commentators
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS-RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CRIMINAL LIMB) (2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/GuideArt 6_criminal ENG.pdf; Case Law
Database, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://echr.coe.int/Pages/home.
aspx?p=caselaw/HUDOC&c= (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; then search
"article 6") (last visited July 14, 2017). Although the ACHR created a regional court
similar to the European Court, that body (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) has
been nowhere near as active as the European Court. See Case Law Database, supra
(follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink) (listing over 54,000 decisions in total); Decisions,
INTER-AM. COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS, http://corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/decisions-and-
judgments (last visited July 14, 2017) (listing only 334 decisions in total).
73. See ACHR, supra note 65, at art. 8, para. 1; European Convention, supra note
65; ICCPR, supra note 65; Universal Declaration, supra note 65.
74. Some commentary exists, but not on the particular points discussed herein. See,
e.g., PIERO LEANZA & ONDREJ PRIDAL, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: ARTICLE 6 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2014) (focusing on a number of specific
rights rather than on general principles of procedural law). Again, analysis of criminal
procedure appears to outpace analysis of civil procedure. See RYAN Goss, CRIMINAL FAIR
TRIAL RIGHTS: ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS (2014).
75. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-58; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2-
3.
76. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model ofArbitration and Its Implications
for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2006); Strong, supra
note 39 (outlining arguments and providing authorities).
77. See Strong, supra note 39 (citing authorities).
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that litigation and arbitration operate as functional equivalents,
particularly in the international realm. 78 Indeed, the recursive nature of
certain challenges to international arbitration may in many cases be
attributable to a lack of appreciation about the true nature of international
arbitration or an unconscious bias in favor of judicial proceedings.79
The wealth of empirical research regarding the propriety of
international arbitration should, by itself, be sufficient to justify Cheng,
Kotuby, and Sobota's decision to rely on arbitral authorities when
developing general principles of procedural law.80 However, the most
important reason to include arbitral standards in the evaluative process is
the one that has caused the most criticism of arbitral proceedings, namely
the fact that some procedural norms are considered waivable in
arbitration.81
Although recent scholarship on "customized" or "bespoke"
litigation suggests that parties may waive or adapt an extremely broad
range of dispute resolution procedures, even in court, those practices
remain largely theoretical. 82 As a result, the most significant procedural
waivers appear in the arbitral context.8 3 However, it is possible not only
78. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342, 357 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2008) (describing equivalence functionalism); Thomas Schultz,
Human Rights: A Speed Bump for Arbitral Procedures? An Exploration of Safeguards in
the Acceleration ofJustice, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 1, 2 (noting "awards are [recognized] as
equivalents to judgments").
79. See Strong, supra note 39.
80. See Thomas W. Wlde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under
the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals' Duty to Ensure,
Pro-Actively, the Equality ofArms, 26 ARB. INT'L 3, 12 (2010).
81. See S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration:
Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 19 (2015).
82. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507, 520-64 (2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private
Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 776-83 (2011); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 389, 426-28; Michael L. Moffitt, Customized
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
461, 462 (2007); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of
Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 516-17 (2009); Henry S. Noyes, If You
(Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in
Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 581 (2007); Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856-
69 (2006); Strong, supra note 32, at 1033-35; Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials,
2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183.
83. For example, waiver of the right to proceed as a class has been deemed
permissible in arbitration, although such a waiver would likely be impermissible in
judicial proceedings. See S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 205-22, 249-53 (2013) (discussing waivers of class
arbitration, including in cases involving international parties).
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that some of the procedures that are considered waivable in arbitration
are not waivable in litigation but also that certain procedures are not
waivable, either in litigation or arbitration.84 For example, it would likely
be impossible to agree to an arbitral or judicial process reflecting an
unequal ability to present evidence or legal argumentation.
While complicated, the distinction between waivable and non-
waivable procedures appears central to consideration of general
principles of procedural law, since the various types of non-waivable
norms would appear to form an irreducible core of procedural law that
would be largely, if not wholly, consistent with international due
process. 86 This is not to say that international arbitration describes the
full panoply of procedural protections that are necessary to comply with
international due process, since a number of procedures that are waivable
by parties in arbitration may be required in judicial proceedings.7
However, this latter phenomenon does not negate the benefit of
identifying at least some of the baseline principles of procedural law
through reliance on arbitral authorities. Indeed, as this Article
demonstrates, reliance on materials generated in international arbitration
advances the understanding of international due process in a way that
exclusive reliance on judicial and treaty-based materials does not."
Although the number and quality of source materials relating to
international arbitration are both broad and deep, the analytical
framework identified by Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota focuses initially on
treaties.89 Here, a distinction must be made between instruments
involving international commercial arbitration (a purely private process
resulting from a contractual agreement between two business entities)
and instruments involving international investment arbitration (a quasi-
public procedure that typically arises by treaty rather than by contract
and that involves a sovereign nation as the respondent), 90 although
84. See Dodge, supra note 82, at 776 ("By definition, waivable rights are those for
which the legislature has issued no pronouncement that the public interest should trump,
the private interest and has only designated a right to one party, facilitating private
bargaining."); Strong, supra note 81, at 19.
85. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 5, at 1321-22.
86. See Dodge, supra note 82, at 772-76; Strong, supra note 81, at 19.
87. See infra Part IV. States may also require heightened evidence of consent of
waiver of certain procedural rights, either in litigation or arbitration. See Strong, supra
note 32, at 1061-69.
88. See infra Part III.
89. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 1, 23, 26; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
61; S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 71-137 (2009) (providing bibliographic
information for materials involving international arbitration).
90. See LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 13-14 (2010); Born,
supra note 29, at 831-39.
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significant similarities exist between the two mechanisms as a matter of
procedure. 91
Analysis of commercial authorities begins with the New York
Convention, which has been signed by 157 states parties and which is
considered one of the most successful treaties in the world.9 2 The most
important aspect of the New York Convention for purposes of this
discussion is Article V, which identifies the exclusive bases for denying
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. 93 Although Article V is
similar to human rights instruments in that it describes procedural
minimums in relatively general terms, the international understanding of
Article V is supplemented by extensive case law from around the
world.9 4
Procedural standards in international commercial arbitration are
further developed through the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law), which has been
adopted in whole or in part in 75 countries and 106 jurisdictions,
including eight U.S. states.95 The Model Arbitration Law was intended to
reinforce the procedural standards outlined in the New York Convention
and therefore describes the various procedural requirements in language
that is essentially identical to that contained in the New York
91. See Andrea Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration,
113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1269, 1272 (2009) ("All of the procedural rules [in investment
arbitration], whether designed specifically for use in commercial arbitrations or not, are
based on commercial arbitration practice.").
92. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; New York Convention
Status, supra note 34 (listing 157 states as parties).
93. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; see also infra note 184 and
accompanying text (reproducing text of Article V).
94. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade Law, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) User Guide, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER. C/GUIDE/l/Rev. 2, at 2-5, paras. 1-18 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL, CLOUT Guide]; U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Dissemination of
Decisions Concerning UNCITRAL Legal Texts and Uniform Interpretation of Such
Texts: Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/267, at 4, 7, TT 8, 16 (Feb. 21, 1985).
95. See New York Convention, supra note 34; U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law,
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/40/17, Annex I (June 21, 1985), amended by Rep. of the U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law, 39th Sess., June 17-July 7, 2006, at pt. 2, para. 47, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, Annex I,
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration
Law]; Status of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985),
with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/1985Modelarbitrationstat
us.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law Status]
(including adherents to both versions of the Model Arbitration Law); STRONG, supra note
89, at 85-87 (discussing CLOUT).
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96Convention. The relative generality of the Model Arbitration Law is
also offset by extensive case law from around the world construing the
97different provisions.
Parties from around the world can easily access judicial decisionis
concerning both the New York Convention and the Model Arbitration
Law through a free electronic database that is hosted by UNCITRAL and
known as CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts). Discussion of
procedural protections in international commercial arbitration can also be
found in various arbitral awards that have been published either in
arbitral reporting series or as part of recognition and enforcement
proceedings in national courts.99 Courts and commentators can also
consult an extensive and ever-increasing body of international
scholarship on international arbitration.100
Investment arbitration offers an equally rich array of source
materials. The analysis begins with Article 52 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention), which describes the procedural
minimums that must be met to avoid annulment of an investment award
and which operates as the functional equivalent of Article V of the New
York Convention.' 01 Although the self-contained nature of the ICSID
regime means that there are no court cases construing ICSID procedures
or awards, the awards themselves provide a considerable amount of
96. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; Model Arbitration Law,
supra note 95, at arts. 34, 36.
97. See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 95; UNCITRAL, CLOUT Guide, supra
note 94, at 2-5, paras. 1-18.
98. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE
LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case law.html (last visited. July 14, 2017); see
also New York Convention, supra note 34; Model Arbitration Law, supra note 95;
UNCITRAL, CLOUT Guide, supra note 94, at 2-5, paras. 1-18; STRONG, supra note 89,
at 85-87 (discussing CLOUT). Other databases also exist. See. 1958 NEW YORK
CONVENTION GUIDE, http://newyorkconventionl958.org/ (last visited July 14, 2017).
99. Awards generated in international commercial arbitration have been published
for decades, typically in denatured (anonymized) form. See STRONG, supra note 89, at
72-88; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1958: TOWARDS A
UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 2-3 (1981).
100. Scholarly commentary plays a particularly important role in international
commercial and investment arbitration. See STRONG, supra note 89, at 28-30. There is a
high degree of consistency in commentary on commercial and investment proceedings,
since investment arbitration modeled itself on international commercial arbitration, at
least in areas of procedure. See Bjorklund, supra note 91, at 1271.
101. See ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at art. 52; New York Convention, supra
note 34, at art. V; see also infra note 187 and accompanying text (reproducing text of
Article 52). According to Article 53, Article 52 is the exclusive means of annulling an
award rendered under the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at
art. 53.
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information on questions of procedure. 10 2 Although these awards were at
one time considered private and confidential, recent initiatives on
transparency in investment arbitration, including the enactment of the
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration in 2014, have greatly increased public access to
investment awards. 103 Indeed, many treaty-based awards are now
published in their entirety.'0 4
Public and private parties have undertaken considerable efforts to
ensure a high degree of consistency in the way that procedural standards
in international arbitration are interpreted and applied by both arbitrators
and national courts.105 Not only does this phenomenon provide a high
degree of confidence in the content of international due process
protections in arbitration, it also is consistent with the way in which
general principles of law develop. 10 6
Together, these features more than justify the inclusion of
international arbitration in the norm-generation process involving general
principles of procedural law. However, there are two additional reasons
why international arbitration should be part of this particular endeavor.
Both rationales are linked to the structure of the arbitral regime.
. The first reason involves how and why international arbitration
became the predominant means of resolving cross-border civil
disputes.107 As it turns out, the path by which international arbitration
developed bears little resemblance to the route taken by domestic
102. The ICSID arbitration system is entirely self-contained, unlike the world of
international commercial arbitration, which interacts with national courts at various
points. See ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at arts. 53-54; S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 3 (2012).
103. See G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based
Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 18, 2014).
104. See Award-ICSID Convention Arbitration, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES (ICSID), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Award-Convention-
Arbitration.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2017).
105. See KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2; STRONG, supra note 102, at 93; see
also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing the CLOUT system). See
generally New York Convention, supra note 34 (setting procedural standards for
enforcement).
106. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 37, at xii. As Schwarzenberger explains:
[T]he international lawyer must call for [succor] from his colleagues in the field
of comparative law. They alone can provide him with authoritative studies on
the scope and limits of the general principles [recognized] by [civilized]
nations. Only on this basis will he then be able to determine which of these
principles of public and private, adjective and substantive, law are applicable in
the environment of present-day international society.
Id.; see also infra Part III.
107. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 93, 97.
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arbitration, which is the procedure that is most familiar to most people.108
In most jurisdictions, domestic arbitration evolved out of a desire to
avoid the formalities associated with judicial procedures and frequently
involves the use of mandatory arbitration provisions imposed by repeat
respondents on weak or vulnerable individuals without any real consent
or knowledge on the part of the future claimants.' 09 International
arbitration, on the other hand, typically involves extremely
knowledgeable commercial or state actors of roughly equal size and
sophistication adopting individually negotiated dispute resolution
provisions as a result of arm's-length bargaining.110 Even more to the
point, international arbitration did not develop in order to avoid judicial
formalities; to the contrary, international arbitration involves an intricate
and diverse array of procedural mechanisms that are very similar to the
normative framework that is used in complex commercial litigation."' In
fact, the most common criticism of international arbitration is not that it
is too informal but that it is too legalistic.1 12.
If international actors did not adopt arbitration to avoid judicial
formalities or impose an unfair procedure on weaker parties, why did the
procedure become the primary means by which international commercial
and investment disputes are resolved? 1l3 The answer lies in the absence
of any international consensus on or international treaties concerning
transnational litigation.11 4 The numerous uncertainties associated with
cross-border litigation, including where a suit will be heard, what
substantive law will control, what procedures will apply, and whether a
judgment can be enforced across national borders, make judicial methods
of dispute resolution far too unpredictable and risky for commercial
108. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 4-5 (discussing consumer and employment
arbitration).
109. See id.; Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REv. 695, 697.
110. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 79. But see Strong, supra note 32, at 1051 (noting
an increase in small and medium sized enterprises in international trade, which may
require reevaluation of the traditional transactional paradigm). Although investment
arbitration arises by treaty, the claimant is the one to choose whether to proceed in
arbitration pursuant to the host state's standing offer to arbitrate. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET
AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11 (6th ed. 2015).
111. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2127 (noting "international arbitration can closely
resemble proceedings in the commercial courts of some major trading states").
112. See S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in International Commercial Arbitration:
A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV.
117, 117 (2013).
113. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 93, 97.
114. See id at 98-102; see also supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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actors."' Furthermore, both public and private entities express concerns
about the neutrality of foreign courts and prefer to have their disputes
heard in a forum that ensures the independence and impartiality of the
decision maker. 1 16 As a result, international arbitration may be more
accurately characterized as a replacement for litigation rather than an
alternative to litigation, as is the case with domestic procedures.' This
phenomenon suggests that international arbitration can and should be
considered a type of lex specialis in the area of international procedural
law.118
The second structural reason why materials relating to international
arbitration are relevant to the process of deriving general principles of
procedural law relates to the fact that arbitral standards operate as
procedural minimums beyond which states and parties may not go."
Furthermore, the New York Convention, ICSID Convention, and other
arbitral authorities do not provide aspirational standards that parties may
adopt or disregard at will; instead, these documents establish legal
binding procedural norms on which there is widespread global
consensus. 120 This feature is significant, since it offsets the view that by
choosing to have their disputes heard in arbitration, parties can
effectively avoid the application of core procedural protections. 121 By
115. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 98-102. Enforcement of foreign judgments is
particularly difficult, particularly compared to the ease with which arbitral awards can be
enforced internationally. See id.
116. See id. at 1529-33, 1988-92.
117. Authorities are unclear as to whether arbitration constitutes a substitute for, an
alternative to, or a supplement to litigation. See LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1, at 1-3 (3d ed. 2010) (noting arbitration coexists with
litigation as "part of the American system of administering justice"); Pierre Mayer,
Comparative Analysis of Power of Arbitrators to Determine Procedures in Civil and
Common Law Systems, 7 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 24, 25 (1996) (noting arbitration is
sometimes considered "a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but
nevertheless pursuing the same ends"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from
Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEv. L.J. 251, 260 (2007) (noting "arbitration is a
substitute for adjudication by litigation"). Some variation may also exist according to the
type of arbitration in question. See EDMONSON, supra, § 1:3, at 1-8 to -9 (noting that early
precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute for litigation and
labor arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial strife, but suggesting that these
distinctions may no longer apply).
118. See Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 55, at 487 (defining lex specialis).
119. See Strong, supra note 32, at 1103. Indeed, some commentators, most notably
Gary Born, have suggested that the New York Convention operates as a type of
constitutional document. Gary B. Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom to
Associate, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 21-23 (2009); Peter B. Rutledge, Introduction:
The Constitutional Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 38 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1, 2 (2009).
120. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 70. See generally New York Convention, supra
note 34; ICSID Convention, supra note 35.
121. See Drahozal, supra note 109, at 697; Kirgis, supra note 76, at 14-15.
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establishing the terms on which arbitration can and will proceed,
including the basic procedural safeguards that must be respected as part
of the arbitral proceeding, states have defined the outer boundaries of
international procedural law. This is not to say that arbitral authorities
describe the full panoply of general principles of procedural law; indeed,
there may be additional standards that must be met in litigation.
Nevertheless, the law of international arbitration provides a number of
extremely useful insights into the general principles of procedural law
that must exist for a dispute resolution procedure to be considered
legitimate.122 This issue is taken up in more detail in the following
section.
B. Strategic Issues Involving the Development of General
Principles ofProcedural Law
As important as it is to identify the proper sources from which to
derive general principles of procedural law, that is only the first step of
the process. 12 3 The second step involves the separation of norms that
reflect a general principle of procedural law from those that can be
characterized as "mere" rules. 24 Niels Petersen has discussed the
difficulty of this task, noting that
The distinction between legal rules and principles is not new and has
frequently been used in international law. However, there is no
consensus on what the difference is between these two categories of
laws. Most often the term principles is used for the more general,
fundamental norms of a legal order, while concrete provisions are
called rules. Such a distinction is, however, of no heuristic value
because it is only of gradual and not qualitative character. 125
The task is further complicated by the close connection between
customary international law and general principles of law.1 2 6 Indeed,
Cheng himself noted that "the line of demarcation between custom and
general principles of law .. . is often not very clear, since international
custom or customary international law, understood in a broad sense, may
122. See supra Section II.A.
123. See Ellis, supra note 21, at 954.
124. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 24 (distinguishing principles and rules); Talmon,
supra note 12, at 981.
125. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 275,
286-87 (2008).
126. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 23. Customary international law is one of several
types of international law. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1,
at art. 38(1)(c) (noting the other sources are treaties (conventions) and general principles
of law).
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include all that is unwritten in international law, i.e., both custom and
general principles of law."1 27
Although the connection between general principles of law and
customary international law can prove challenging, it also provides
important insights into how the former develops. For example, Ian
Brownlie has stated any practice that is to be recognized as customary
international law must be of sufficient duration, reflect a degree of
uniformity and consistency, be of a general nature, and be accepted as
law.1 2 8 He has also argued that "collections of municipal cases" are
critical to the "assessment of the customary law."1 2 9
In the past, it has been difficult to establish the requisite amount of
uniformity and consistency in the area of procedural law, because
research into municipal cases typically demonstrated an absence of any
commonality of procedure due to the parochialism and exceptionalism
that is the hallmark of national civil procedure.'" As a result, most
commentators have concluded that there is no customary international
law of procedure, although there are those who take a contrary view.131
However, expanding the analysis to include sources derived from
international arbitration effectively negates claims that procedural norms
are too diverse to generate any overarching norms of behavior. 132 Indeed,
a number of the procedural norms discussed by Cheng, Kotuby, and
Sobota appear to meet Brownlie's test for customary international law.' 3 3
As intriguing as that analysis may be, this Article does not seek to
determine whether and to what extent an international customary law of
127. CHENG, supra note 20, at 23.
128. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 7-8 (2008).
129. Id. at 52.
130. See Clermont, supra note 9, at 530; Marcus, supra note 9, at 709, 740.
131. See Francioni, supra note 46, at 1-2; Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by
Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists-Passage of
Aut Dedere Aut Judicare into Customary Law & Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death
Penalty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 497-503 (2003) (offering both sides of the
argument that aut dedere aut judicare constitutes a form of customary international
procedural law); Wilde, supra note 80, at 12. Part of the problem is that most
commentary on customary international law has focused on substantive concerns.
132. As the preceding paragraphs note, there are a significant number of domestic
court decisions relating to international due process in the arbitral setting as well as an
ever-increasing number of arbitral awards on that subject. See supra notes 98-100 and
accompanying text (discussing CLOUT).
133. See BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 6-7 (discussing evidence of international
custom); CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 157-
202; see also Fr6ddric G. Sourgens, Law's Laboratory: Developing International Law on
Investment Protection as Common Law, 35 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 181, 185, 187-88
(2014) (suggesting awards from investment arbitration can evince customary
international law based on an inductive, rather than deductive, analytical approach);
Strong, supra note 32, at 1096-97 (applying Brownlie's analysis to procedural principles
developed for and reflected in international arbitration).
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procedure exists. Instead, the focus here is on general principles of
procedural law. According to Cheng, the process of identifying general
principles of law differs from that relating to customary international law
to the extent the former includes:
[an] element of recognition on the part of [civilized] peoples but the
requirement of a general practice is absent. The object of recognition is,
therefore, no longer the legal character of the rule implied in an
international usage, but the existence of certain principles intrinsically
legal in nature. This part of international law consists in the general
principles of that social phenomenon common to all [civilized]
societies which is called law. 134
Other commentators appear to agree with this approach.135
Therefore, under the Brownlie-Cheng test, a particular norm may be
classified as a general principle of procedural law so long as the concept
has endured for a sufficiently long period of time, reflects a degree of
uniformity and consistency, is of a general nature, and reflects a legal
character. 136
II. CONTENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
A. Using Content-Based Analyses to Determine Appropriate
Source Materials
Academics have long recognized that choices about research
methodology can be outcome-determinative. 13 7 This phenomenon is
134. CHENG, supra note 20, at 24.
135. See BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 162 (2010) (discussing the relationship between customary
international law and general principles of law); Petersen, supra note 125, at 277 (noting
general principles of law do not require proof of state practice).
136. See BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 7-8; CHENG, supra note 20, at 24; see also
Bassiouni, supra note 21, at 768. Cherif Bassiouni states:
The writings of scholars and opinions of international and national tribunals
have invariably confirmed that 'General Principles' are, first, expressions of
national legal systems, and, second, expressions of other unperfected sources of
international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ and ICJ; namely,
conventions, customs, writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ.
Bassiouni, supra note 21, at 768; Ellis, supra note 21, at 954. Jaye Ellis similarly notes:
The methodology indicated in doctrinal writings is generally described as
involving two steps: first, the identification of a principle that is common to
municipal legal orders belonging to the main legal systems of the world;
secondly, the distillation of the essence of the principle. To these is often added
a third, namely modifying the principle to suit the particularities of
international law.
Ellis, supra note 21, at 954 (footnote omitted).
137. - See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
"Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1918 (2011); William Thomas
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critical to the current analysis, since reliance on different bodies of law
can yield very different results about the content of general principles of
procedural law. 138
Part II of this Article used a forward-looking methodological
analysis to demonstrate the practical and theoretical reasons why
materials involving international arbitration can, and should, be taken
into account when identifying general principles of procedural law. 13 9
However, it is also possible to test the propriety of that approach from a
backward-looking, content-based perspective that seeks to determine
whether, and to what extent, general principles of procedural law can be
derived without recourse to arbitral materials. 14 0 In so doing, this step
provides a substantive double-check of the methodology used in Part II.
As it turns out, insights about general principles of procedural law
can be gleaned from a number of different areas of law. 141 For example, a
number of commentators, including Kotuby and Sobota, have considered
procedural elements involving the rule of law. 142 Although A.V. Dicey's
classical definition of the rule of law enunciated a somewhat limited
concept that emphasized "[f]irst, the supremacy of law over arbitrary
power (the rule of law, not men, is the slogan generally associated with
this influential concept); second, equality before the law of all, including
government officials; and, third, constitutional law as fundamental
law,"1 4 3 subsequent analysis by legal philosophers ranging from Lon
Fuller and Joseph Raz to John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin suggests that
the rule of law cannot be characterized solely as a structural norm but
must also include certain fundamental values.144
Worster, The Transformation of Quantity into Quality: Critical Mass in the Formation of
Customary International Law, 31 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 1, 72 (2013).
138. See Gluck, supra note 137, at 1918; Worster, supra note 137, at 72.
139. See supra Part II.
140. See infra notes 141-232.
141. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 10-23; JAKsIC, supra note 54, at 218; KOTUBY &
SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 71-73.
142. See JAKSIC, supra note 54, at 218; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 71-73;
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (2008)
(discussing procedural aspects of the rule of law).
143. Daniel B. Rodriguez et al., The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455,
1465-66 (2010) (citing A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 183-205 (10th ed. 1959)).
144. See id. at 1469-71; see also Desierto, supra note 31, at 948. The rule of law is
intimately connected with some conception of justice, which can reflect "corrective,
substantive, distributive, social, procedural, organizational, interactional, interpersonal,
communicative, communitarian, restorative, and transitional" values, depending on the
circumstances. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other
Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 28 (2008); see also id.
at 28-32 (linking different commentators to different conceptions of justice).
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Jeremy Waldron has used this jurisprudential foundation to develop
"[a] procedural understanding of the Rule of Law" that does not simply
demand "that officials apply the rules as they are set out; it [also]
requires application of the rules with all the care and attention to fairness
that is signaled by ideals such as 'natural justice' and 'procedural due
process.,, 14 5 Perhaps the most useful application of this concept is found
in the work of Gunnar Bergholtz, who used a comparative international
methodology to identify a "procedural trinity" that is necessary to
establish the rule of law.146 According to Bergholtz, the rule of law
requires courts to recognize'and protect
1. the audiatur principle (audiatur et altera pars), which in England and
America forms part of natural justice and due process of law;
2. explicit reasons and fact finding; [and]
3. the right to appeal. 147
While useful, this standard is clearly incomplete, since it fails to
include certain principles (such as notice of a determination of the
parties' legal rights) that are universally considered necessary as a matter
of procedural justice.148 Furthermore, two of the three elements included
in Bergholtz's trinity (i.e., the right to appeal and the right to explicit
reasons and fact-finding) are waivable by parties in arbitration and
perhaps in litigation,149 even though many countries consider an appeal
on the merits to be a fundamental or constitutional right.so These
145. Waldron, supra note 142, at 7-8; see also Rodriguez et al., supra note 143, at
1470-71.
146. See Gunnar Bergholtz, Ratio Et Auctoritas: A Comparative Study of the
Significance of Reasoned Decisions with Special Reference to Civil Cases, 33
SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 11, 44 (1989).
147. Id.
148. See AM. LAW INST. & INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 22-23 (2006) [hereinafter ALI &
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] (requiring "notice. . . by means that are reasonably likely to be
effective"); CHENG, supra note 20, at 291; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 158-64;
Solum, supra note 8, at 192. But see Solum, supra note 8, at 183 ("Even the United States
Supreme Court seems to have suggested that the most basic procedural rights, notice and
an opportunity to be heard, may be denied if the balance of interests does not favor
them."). While some fundamental procedural protections (such as notice) may be
waivable in certain circumstances, states will scrutinize those choices in some detail. See
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972); Nat'1 Equip. Rental v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); Noyes, supra note 82, at 596-97; Thornburg, supra note
82, at 209-10 (discussing criteria that might govern procedural autonomy).
149. See Strong, supra note 81, at 19.
150. See Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44. Although a number of jurisdictions,
particularly those from the common law tradition, have suggested that the right to an
appeal in civil matters is neither constitutional nor fundamental in nature, that view is by
no means universal. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 241 (providing a
constitutional right to appeal); CONSTITUTION OF PERU (2009), art. 139(6) (protecting
"[t]he plurality of the jurisdictional level," meaning appeal); CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA
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problems suggest that general principles of procedural law cannot be
derived solely from the literature on the procedural aspects of the rule of
law.151
Another field of interest involves international human rights. 152
Reliance on human rights norms might be particularly attractive not only
because of the multiple references to procedural law in different
international instruments but also because of the degree of deference
shown to some of those provisions.153 The most notable example of the
latter involves Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which is
respected by both national and international courts as a fundamental
norm of procedural law. 15 4 Although Article 6(1) is relatively general, as
is typical of procedural standards in international human rights
instruments, and only applies on a regional basis, it has been judicially
construed on numerous occasions and thus provides somewhat detailed
insights into basic procedural norms.155 Article 6(1) is also useful
(2006), art. 36 ("Everyone shall have the right to an appeal or other legal remedy against
any decision on his rights, obligations or lawful interests."); Nat'l Union of Marine
Cooks and Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954) (noting in the context of U.S.
constitutional law that "[w]hile a statutory review is important and must be exercised
without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process"); Tolstoy
Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, No. 18139/91, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442, 460-62 (1995)
(stating the English Court of Appeal could require security for costs without violating
Article 6.1 of the European Convention); Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in
the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 457, 468 (2000); Vincenzo Varano, The
Modern Civil Process: Judicial and Alternative Forms ofDispute Resolution in England,
28 CIv. JUST. Q. 152, 154-55 (2009) (reviewing NEIL ANDREws, THE MODERN CIVIL
PROCESS: JUDICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE FoRMs OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENGLAND
(2008)) (noting that appeals under English law "have been made subject to permission
either by the court of first instance or by the appellate court" and noting that "[t]his is
something which civil lawyers should give some thought, since first instance judgments
continue to be normally subject to appeal as of right" because "[a]ppeal is so deeply
rooted in the civil law tradition as to be considered a part of the fundamental guarantee of
a fair procedure"). Only a handful of countries allow appeals of arbitral awards on the
merits. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69 (Eng.); 3 BORN, supra note 3, at 3181, 3341.
151. Difficulties also arise to the extent that there are no treaties focusing on the rule
of law per se, and the most popular methodological approaches to general principles of
law require analysis of international instruments. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 1, 23, 26;
KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 61. Similar problems arise with respect to the
shortage of municipal case law on the rule of law as a standalone concept. See Bassiouni,
supra note 21, at 768; Ellis, supra note 21, at 954-55.
152. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
154. See European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 § 4 (Ire.) (requiring Irish
courts to take the European Convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court into
account when construing certain issues); Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2 (Eng.)
(same); European Convention, supra note 65, at art. 6, para 1; see also supra note 72 and
accompanying text (regarding jurisprudence of the European Court involving Article
6(1)).
155. See Case Law Database, supra note 72; EUROPEAN COURT, CIVIL LIMB, supra
note 72. According to the European Court, the Court's judgments on Article 6.1
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because its procedural provisions are in many ways similar to procedural
standards found in more generally applicable human rights documents,
which opens the door to analyses based on analogy.s6 -
The civil aspects of Article 6(1) state that
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 'and impartial
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests ofjustice.s15 7
As useful as this standard may initially seem, a number of problems
arise upon closer examination. For example, Article 6(1) fails to mention
the right to an appeal, which is not only part of Bergholtz's "procedural
serve not only to decide those cases brought before [the Court] but, more
generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the
Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the
engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties (Ireland v. the United
Kingdom, § 154, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25...
The mission of the system set up by the Convention is thus to determine
issues of public policy in the general interest, thereby raising the standards of
protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence
throughout the community of the Convention States (Konstantin Markin v.
Russia [GC], § 89, no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012).
EUROPEAN COURT, CIVIL LIMn, supra note 72, at 5.
156. See European Convention, supra note 65, at art. 6, para. 1.
157. Id. Criminal proceedings are subject to additional protections under the
European Convention. For example, Article 6 goes on to state:
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
Id at art. 6, paras. 2-3.
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trinity" but which is also explicitly mentioned by Cheng as a
fundamental element of international due process.158 Article 6(1) also
incorporates certain elements not found in various commentary,
including the requirement that parties are ordinarily entitled to a public
hearing. 159
While the concept of a public hearing is central to contemporary
notions about the administration of justice, 16 0 some types of non-public
procedures (most notably interstate arbitration) have long been
considered legitimate. 16 1 Furthermore, it is unclear whether, and to what
extent, certain long-cherished views. about the nature of civil justice
remain valid in an era where non-judicial forms of dispute resolution,
including negotiated and mediated settlements, predominate, both
domestically and internationally. 16 2 While this observation should not be
taken to suggest that the requirement of a public hearing is not important
and should not be retained, it does indicate a need to consider such issues
in light of contemporary law, practice, and theory.163
As this example shows, human rights law cannot provide all the
answers to questions about the content of international due process.
However, this is not to say, that human rights law is irrelevant to the
current analysis; indeed, a variety of commentators, most notably Petra
Butler, have argued that international arbitration is not only consistent
with various human rights norms but is built on core principles reflected
in the International Bill of Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration, the
ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
158. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 372; Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44.
159. See European Convention, supra note 65, at art. 6, para. 1.
160. Article 6.1's reference to a public procedure has occasionally been used to
challenge the legitimacy of arbitration, although most authorities have held that aspect to
be inapplicable if the right to a public hearing has been properly waived by the parties to
arbitration. See id at art. 6, para. 1; Tabbane v. Switzerland, App. No. 41069/12 (Mar.
24, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161870 (available only in French);
Stretford v. Football Assoc. Ltd. [2007] EWCA (Civ) 238, [45] (Eng.); JULIAN D. M. LEW
ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 90-93, paras. 5-57 to
-67 (2003).
161. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 8-19.
162. See id. at 96 (noting, in the international realm, "[t]he number of disputes that
are settled by negotiation dwarfs those that are litigated or arbitrated"); Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004); S.I. Strong, Defining the
Litigation Default (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Strong, Litigation Default] (discussing
"the Benthamite notion that civil justice is an intrinsically public endeavour"); S.I.
Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial
Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1973, 1983-85 (2016) (discussing increasing interest
in international commercial mediation).
163. See Strong, Litigation Default, supra note 162.
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Cultural Rights).' Instead, the argument here is that human rights
instruments, by themselves, cannot provide a comprehensive
understanding of the requisite procedural norms. As a result, it is
necessary to consult other areas of law.
The next discipline that might be considered involves transnational
litigation. This field was deemed somewhat problematic in the forward-
looking methodological analysis conducted in Part II due to the scarcity
of binding international instruments, and similar difficulties would arise
under a content-based assessment, since the absence of any broadly
applicable treaties suggests the lack of widespread international
consensus on the relevant principles. However, some useful insights
might be gleaned from soft law documents like the Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure (AL/UNIDROIT Principles), which were
promulgated by the American Law Institute (ALI) and UJNIDROIT as
part of an effort to harmonize civil procedural norms applicable to cross-
border commercial cases. 166 In fact, Kotuby and Sobota specifically
mention this project as a possible source of inspiration, since the ALI/
UNIDROIT Principles reflect international consensus on a number of
important issues and were developed through cross-border comparative
analysis, which is critical to the process of determining the content of
general principles of law.167
Although the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles offer some interesting
insights, they are not a panacea. 168 For example, the ALJIUNIDROIT
Principles share some common ground with commentary generated
through rule of law analyses, in that both paradigms require respect for
the audiatur principle, reasoned judgments, and the right to appeal. 16 9
However, the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles suggest that a number of
additional procedures, including but not limited to jurisdiction and
notice, must also exist if a particular process is to be considered
164. See ICCPR, supra note 65; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3; Universal
Declaration, supra note 65; Butler, supra note 66, at 332; see also Susan L. Karamanian,
The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv.
423, 432 (2013).
165. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing COCA).
166. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148; see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., et al., Reporters'Preface to id. at xxvii, xxvii (noting the initiative was meant
"to overcome fundamental differences between common-law and civil-law systems and,
among common-law systems, to cope with the peculiarities of the U.S. system").
167. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 20-24; KOTUBY &
SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 69; Schwarzenberger, supra note 37, at xii.
168. See Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44.
169. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 20-23, 41-42, 47;
Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44.
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legitimate. 170 While the lack of consistency between the ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles and rule of law requirements is not fatal-indeed, it was
expected that different disciplines would yield different results-
divergence requires additional analysis to determine which approach is
preferable.
Another issue involves the level of detail used to define the relevant
concepts. For example, Bergholtz describes audiatur et altera pars in
very general terms, likening it to natural justice in England and due
process in the United States. 71 In contrast, the ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles provide much more specificity, noting that. the audiatur
principle includes "the right to submit relevant contentions of fact and
law and to offer supporting evidence;" the ability to "have a fair
opportunity and reasonably adequate time to respond to contentions of
fact and law and to evidence presented by another party, and to orders
and suggestions made by the court;" and the requirement of "equal
treatment and reasonable opportunity for litigants to assert or defend
their rights" and "avoidance of any kind of illegitimate discrimination,
particularly on the basis of nationality or residence."172 Additional
insights into the scope and nature of audiatur et altera pars can be found
in the ALIUNIDROIT Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, which
were meant to "provid[e] greater detail and illustrat[e] concrete
fulfillment of the Principles." 7
While the level of detail provided by the ALI and UNIDROIT is
very useful and is, in fact, similar to the type of extensive analysis
conducted by Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota in their texts, 174 the ALI and
UNIDROIT were seeking to establish a new code of civil procedure and,
therefore, include a number of issues, such as those involving the nature
of judicial pleadings and case management techniques, that cannot be
characterized as general principles of procedural law.17 1 Instead, those
provisions are better described as rules or principles of judicial
administration. 17 6 While those elements could theoretically be set aside,
scholars have found it difficult to distinguish between procedures that are
170. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 18-20, 22-24.
171. See Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44.
172. ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 20-23, 41-42.
173. Id. at 99; RICHARD GARNETr, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (2012).
174. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 290-98 (discussing the audiatur principle);
KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 176-83 (discussing procedural equality and the
right to be heard).
175. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 111-13, 117-20, 144-
46; Strong, supra note 32, at 1114-15.
176. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 111-13, 117-20, 144-
46; Strong, supra note 32, at 1115.
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purely adjudicative and procedures that are merely administrative, which
suggests that reliance on the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles would lead to
extensive debate about which elements were procedural and which
elements were administrative.1 77 As a result, this instrument is not as
helpful as it initially appears.
Reliance on the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles is also problematic
because of the limited practical success of the initiative.1 78 Ten years
after their adoption, the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles do not appear to
have been formally adopted by any jurisdiction. 179 This is not to say that
the initiative was a complete failure, because the European Law Institute
is relying heavily on the ALJIUNIDROIT Principles in a project seeking
to establish what will be known as the European Rules of Civil
Procedure, but the lack of widespread state support for the document
suggests the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles cannot be read as reflecting
general principles of procedural law under the Brownlie-Cheng test. 180
Indeed, these and other difficulties ultimately led Kotuby and Sobota to
177. See generally ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148; see also Dodge,
supra note 82, at 766 (distinguishing procedures relating to court administration from
procedures involving party conduct); Strong, supra note 32, at 1115.
178. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148.
179. See id at xxix, xxxviii-xxxix (noting effect of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles in
Mexico); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the
Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 23 (2011).
180. See Study LXXVIA-Transnational Civil Procedure-Formulation of Regional
Rules, INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAw, http://www.unidroit.org/work-
in-progress/transnational-civil-procedure (last updated Sept. 21, 2017); see also ALI &
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 148; BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 7-8; CHENG,
supra note 20, at 24. Interestingly, a number of European countries are planning to
develop new English-language courts to handle cross-border commercial matters in
response to the United Kingdom's expected withdrawal from the European Union. See
Creation of an English-speaking International Commercial Court in Brussels, LExGO
(Oct. 30, 2017) (discussing the Brussels International Business Court (BIBC)),
https://www.lexgo.be/en/papers/judicial-law/international-private-law/creation-of-an-
english-speaking-international-commercial-court-in-brussels, 1 14947.html; Karin
Matussek & Gaspard Sebag, Paris, Frankfurt Try to Grab Lucrative Legal Action From
London, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-11-07/paris-frankfurt-try-to-grab-lucrative-legal-action-from-
london; Mattias Weller, The Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main 2017,
CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Mar. 31, 2017), http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/the-justice-
initiative-frankfurt-am-main-2017-law-made-in-frankfurt/. Perhaps the most intriguing of
these English-language commercial courts will be seated in Paris and will adopt common
law procedures where appropriate. See Leigh Thomas & Michel Rose, Brexit: France
Promises New Court to Handle English Law Cases in Bid to Lure UK-based Firms,
INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2017, 15:41 BST), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/
news/brexit-france-promises-new-court-to-handle-english-law-cases-in-bid-to-lure-uk-
based-firms-a7817281.html. As part of their analysis, the French courts may have to
determine what procedural mechanisms are required as a part of procedural fairness in
civil actions.
[Vol. 122:2380
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
decide not to give much weight to the ALILUNIDROIT Principles in
their analysis.
The shortcomings associated with the jurisprudence concerning the
rule of law, international human rights, and transnational litigation led
Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota to look elsewhere for guidance about the
nature and scope of general principles of procedural law.1 82 As it turned
out, international arbitration provided significant insights not found in
other fields of study. 18 3
The analysis begins with Article V of the New York Convention,
which states in part:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and
enforcement is sought, proof that:
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(d) The ... arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place ...
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country. 184
181. See ALI & UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES; supra note 148; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra
note 23, at 69, 157-202.
182. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-58; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2-
3.
183. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-58; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 2-
3.
184. New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; see also 1 BORN, supra note 3,
at 117-26 (discussing other international conventions on arbitration). Article V also
addresses the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or the incapacity of the parties, see
New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V, para. 1(a), matters not falling within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, see id. at art. V, para. 1(c), appointment of the arbitral
tribunal, see id. at art. V, para. 1(d), awards that have not yet become binding or that have
been set aside, see id. at art. V, para. 1(e), and the non-arbitrability of the subject matter
of the dispute, see id. at art. V, para. 2(a). However, these matters are not procedural in
2018] 381
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Commentators have noted that the concepts reflected in Article V(1)
"safeguard the parties against private injustice," while those found in
Article V(2) "serve[] as an explicit catchall for the enforcement of a
country's own vital interests.""' Although questions relating to
procedural fairness are usually considered under Article V(1), courts or
parties occasionally elevate such matters to Article V(2)(b), which allows
application of the public policy of the forum state, albeit through an
international lens.
18 6
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention is soiewhat similar to the New
York Convention in both language and purpose, stating:.
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application
in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the
following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of
the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental
rule of procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is
based.1 87
Although Article V of the New York Convention and Article 52 of
the ICSID Convention are critical to the identification and protection of
general principles of procedural law, these instruments do not operate in
isolation. 188 Instead, both treaties work in tandem with national
arbitration laws, 1 89 institutional rules,' 90 soft law,1 91 and persuasive
the same way that the issues described in Articles V(1)(b), V(1)(d), and V(2)(b) are. See
id. at art. V, paras 1(b), 1(d), 2(b).
185. William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law:
Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 259 (2006).
186. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class
Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 59-60 (2008).
187. ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at art. 52; see also New York Convention,
supra note 34, at art. V.
188. See ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at art. 52; New York Convention, supra
note 34, at art. V; 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2154; STRONG, supra note 102, at 12
(discussing how different aspects of arbitral law work together).
189. Arbitration laws are not the same as rules of civil procedure. See STRONG, supra
note 102, at 14. National rules of civil procedure do not apply in arbitration, unless the
parties have an explicit agreement to that effect. See Matter of the Arbitration Between
InterCarbon Berm., Ltd. and Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
190. See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (ARBITRATION RULES) (2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.
org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partf.htm (providing rules for ICSID arbitrations);
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authority, including publicly available arbitral awards, to create a just
and predictable dispute resolution regime.1 9 2 Each type of authority (i.e.,
treaties, national laws, arbitral rules, etc.) addresses a different part of the
arbitral process and functions in a slightly different manner, which
means that some core procedural principles are not reflected in the New
York Convention or the ICSID Convention. 193 However, that
phenomenon does not mean that those norms are unprotected; instead,
those particular values are simply addressed elsewhere.1 94
For example, those who are unfamiliar with the intricacies of
international arbitration law might believe that arbitral tribunals do not
need to be impartial, independent, and neutral because those principles
are not specifically mentioned in the New York Convention. 195 In fact,
the international arbitral regime places an extremely high value on
arbitrator impartiality, independence, and neutrality, and protects those
concepts in several interlocking ways.1 96
Perhaps the most common means of ensuring arbitral impartiality,
independence, and neutrality is through provisions found in arbitral rules
that are voluntarily chosen by the parties to govern the proceedings.1 9 7
STRONG, supra note 102, at 7-9 (discussing arbitral rules of procedure for international
commercial proceedings).
191. Various forms of soft law exist in this area of law. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on
Int'l Trade Law, Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph
2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. A/6/17, at 62 (July 7, 2006) (suggesting how
national courts should interpret certain aspects of the New York Convention).
192. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 12. Arbitral awards are published far more
frequently than most people realize and are an excellent source of information about the
procedures used in arbitration. See id at 21-23. Scholarly commentary holds a particular
place of prestige in international commercial arbitration due to civil law influences and
the private nature of the arbitral procedure. See id. at 23-24.
193. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 12-24. See generally ICSID Convention, supra
note 35; New York Convention, supra note 34.
194. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 67-68.
195. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V; 1 BORN, supra note 3, at
67-68. Those qualities are mentioned in the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention,
supra note 35, at art. 14(1); see also id. at arts. 31(2), 40(2).
196. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 1529-33, 1988-92.
197. See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (ARBITRATION RULES) r. 6 (2003), https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Documents/resources/ICSIDConv%20Reg%20Rules EN 2003.pdf [hereinafter
ICSID 2003 ARBITRATION RULES]; INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES
art. 11 (2017), https://iccwbo.org/publication/arbitration-rules-and-mediation-rules/
[hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION,
ARBITRATION RULES 2014 art. 5 (2014), http://www.cia.org/Dispute Resolution_
Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [hereinafter LCIA ARBITRATION RULES]; U.N.
COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES arts. 11-12 (as revised
in 2010), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-
revised-2010-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES]; see also 2 BORN,
supra note 3, at 1988-92, 2137.
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Although it is impossible to know precisely how many of the 3,000 to
5,000 international commercial and investment arbitrations that are filed
each year are governed by formal arbitral rules, experts agree that a
"very substantial proportion of international arbitrations are conducted
pursuant to institutional arbitration rules of some sort."- Whenever
parties adopt any type of arbitral rules to govern an arbitral proceeding,
those norms are then given explicit effect in international enforcement
proceedings pursuant to Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention,
which allows national courts to deny recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award if "the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties."l 99 Furthermore, even if the parties do not
choose to have their arbitration governed by a particular rule set, the
principle of impartiality, independence, and neutrality may still be
protected under Article V(1)(d) if the parties have incorporated specific
language on that issue in their arbitration agreement or if national law
can be used to fill a contractual gap.200
Article V of the New York Convention applies to actions to
recognize and enforce arbitral awards and is therefore primarily
applicable to matters brought in countries other than the place where the
arbitration was held.2 0 1 However, parties can also seek to have an arbitral
award recognized and enforced at the arbitral seat, and those proceedings
are typically governed by domestic law.202 Most national arbitration
laws, including those based on the Model Arbitration Law, indicate that
courts should not recognize or enforce an arbitral award that is contrary
to the procedural agreement of the parties (which would include explicit
agreements regarding the impartiality, independence, and neutrality of
the arbitrators as well as implicit agreements on those matters, as
reflected in any arbitral rules adopted by the parties) or that violates the
198. 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2138; see also id. at 94-96. Arbitrations that are
administered by arbitral institutions are referred to as institutional arbitrations, whereas
arbitrations that are not administered by an institution are referred to as ad hoc
arbitrations. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 7-9. Formal rule sets exist for both types of
procedures. See id. See generally ICSID 2003 ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197; ICC
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197; LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197;
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197 (for use in ad hoc proceedings).
199. See New York Convention, supra note 34, at art. V, para. 1(d).
200. See id. (allowing non-recognition and non-enforcement of an arbitral award in
cases where the parties did not have an explicit agreement regarding procedural issues
but where the procedure that was actually used "was not in accordance with the law. of
the country where the arbitration took place").
201. See id. at art. I, para. 1; STRONG, supra note 102, at 12-14 (noting the role of the
New York Convention in international arbitration, including its application in the United
States to awards characterized as "non-domestic").
202. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 14-16 (noting the role of national law in
international arbitration).
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principle of arbitral impartiality, independence, or neutrality.2 03
Furthermore, parties typically do not have to wait until the arbitration has
concluded to raise issues regarding impartiality, independence, or
neutrality, but can instead challenge an arbitrator at the time of
appointment or at the time evidence of impartiality or lack of
independence or neutrality comes to light.20
Not only does international arbitration provide a wide range of
procedures to enforce the principles of arbitral impartiality,
independence, and neutrality, it also has made significant strides in
defining what precisely is meant by those particular terms. Initially,
arbitral impartiality, independence, and neutrality were defined by the
same type of general codes and canons that apply to judges. 205 However,
in 2004, the International Bar Association (1BA) published the IBA
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (revised in
2014), which revolutionized the field of international ethics by providing
parties, arbitrators, and courts with a much more detailed understanding
of how and when certain ethical norms should be applied in a world of
multinational law firms and corporate entities.206
Although it is impossible to provide an in-depth analysis of each
element of international due process within the scope of the current
203. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(2), 201, 208, 301, 307 (2012); Arbitration Act 1996, c.
23, § 24 (Eng.); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 95, at arts. 11-12.
204. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2015-16, 1913-38. While the Federal Arbitration
Act does not include a provision allowing U.S. courts to hear interim challenges to the
arbitrators, U.S. courts will require the parties to comply with any interim challenge
procedures to which the parties have agreed, including those that are described in any
applicable arbitral rules. See id. at 1913-38; STRONG, supra note 102, at 60-61. Many
rule sets identify a precise procedure by which challenges to arbitrators should be made,
therefore eliminating much of the uncertainty associated with the process. See 2 BORN,
supra note 3, at 1913-38.
205. Compare AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES .3-5 Canons 1-2 (2004),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/documentrepository/CommercialCodeofEthic
s for Arbitrators 2010_10 14.pdf, with ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 14
Canon 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/judicialethics/ABA MCJC_approved.authcheckdam.pdf; STUDY GRP. OF THE
INT'L LAW Ass'N ON THE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF INT'L COURTS & TRIBUNALS &
PROJECT ON INT'L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES ON THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY (2004), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/
docs/burgh final_21204.pdf [hereinafter THE BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES] (providing
principles applicable to full-time international judges but suggesting their possible use for
other types of judges and international arbitrators); see also CATHERINE A. ROGERS,
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014).
206. See INT'L BAR ASS'N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN.
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION Gen. Princs. 1-2 (2014), http://www.ibanet.org/
Publications/publicationsIBA guidesandfreematerials.aspx.
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Article,20 7 the discussion does not need to be very detailed to demonstrate
how useful arbitral authorities are to the determination of general
principles of procedural law under the Brownlie-Cheng test. 20 8 Not only
do arbitral materials provide a comprehensive understanding of the
content of international due process, they also illustrate the binding
nature of those norms.209 For example, it is widely accepted that the
concept of international due process in international arbitration "refers to
a number of notions with varying names under different national laws,
including natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to
be heard, the so-called principle de la contradiction and equal
treatment." 210 Furthermore, international due process is universally
characterized "as a 'hard' rule of law, a kind of a core or foundation of
all other procedural rules, the violation or disregard of which will lead to
unenforceability of the award or decision given." 2 1 1 "In many national
laws this core is described as ordre public or public policy." 2 12
The fundamental nature of these rights indicates that
[t]he parties cannot ... waive the irreducible core of procedural
guarantees, such as the right to an independent and impartial court, the
right to a fair trial and the due process of law which are sine qua non
for liberty, dignity, justice and primarily for the maintenance of the
precedence of the rule of law principle. 213
Furthermore, the inability to waive these protections strongly
suggests that these standards reflect general principles of procedural law
that are as applicable in litigation as they are in arbitration.2 14
207. See STRONd, supra note 89, at 71-137 (discussing arbitral authority and
providing an extensive bibliography of works). Entire books have been devoted to the
subject of international due process in arbitration. See generally KURKELA & SNELLMAN,
supra note 5; KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 5; GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004).
208. See BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 7-8; CHENG, supra note 20, at 24.
209. See KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 5, at 1, 4; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note
5, at 1321-22.
210. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 5, at 1321-22.
211. KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 5, at 1.
212. Id. at 4. "Public policy" and "ordre public" are not entirely synonymous. For
example,
In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, the meaning of "public policy" is relatively
narrow, referring to "matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the
like" and is distinguishable from matters related to due process. In the
continental European tradition public policy, or ordre public, refers to a wider
range of judicial concerns, a range that "encompasses breaches of procedural
justice."
Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, 20 ARB.
INT'L 333, 334 (2004).
213. JAKSIC, supra note 54, at 218.
214. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 59.
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The notion that these values reflect general principles of procedural
law is not contradicted by the fact that the arbitral regime tolerates a
considerable amount of diversity in how these norms are implemented.2 15
Variations arise as a result of the autonomy exercised by the parties in
arbitration agreements and arbitral rules of procedure as well as through
default provisions in national arbitration laws.2 16 Arbitral tribunals also
exercise a certain amount of discretion to ensure that the procedures are
tailored to the dispute at hand.2 17
The flexibility with which the various procedural norms are
implemented suggests that these concepts can be considered principles
rather than hard and fast rules.218 This is a critical distinction because the
process of determining general principles of procedural law "does not,"
as Cheng noted, "consist . .. in specific rules formulated for practical
purposes, but in general propositions underlying the various rules of law
which express the essential qualities of juridical truth itself, in short of
Law."219
International arbitration-like international adjudication-clearly
includes both rules and principles. Cheng described the difference
between the two thusly:
A rule ... is essentially practical and, moreover, binding; there are
rules of art as there are rules of government, while a principle expresses
a general truth, which guides our action, serves as a theoretical basis for
the various acts of our life, and the application of which to reality
- 220produces a given consequence.
Under this definition, institutional rules of arbitral procedure, like
judicial rules of court and rules of civil procedure, reflect the specific
way that a legal system-be it national or international, arbitral or
judicial-chooses to implement or protect various procedural
principles. 2 2 1 Rules reflect but one way to implement a particular
215. See Schultz, supra note 78, at 9.
216. See LEW ET AL., supra note 160, at 522-26, paras. 21-5 to -18.
217. See id. at 523-24, paras. 21-12 to -13. Though potentially broad, arbitral
discretion is largely circumscribed in practice by party agreement as well as by the norms
and principles described in various treatises, rules, and arbitral awards, and therefore is
not completely unbounded. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 19.
218. The distinction between procedural rules and procedural norms has been
important in other contexts. See Talmon, supra note 12, at 981 (discussing immunity
issues).
219. CHENG, supra note 20, at 24.
220. Id.
221. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 18-20. See generally FED. R. CIv. P.; ICC
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197; ICSID 2003 ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197;
LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 197; UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra
note 197.
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principle, and the underlying concept may be given effect through a
variety of different means. Although many of the difficulties in
international procedural law have arisen because of a focus on rules
rather than principles,222 comparative analyses of different rules
addressing the procedural concern can be used to identify both the
existence and content of a particular principle.223 Indeed, that is precisely
how the arbitral community developed its understanding of international
due process.2 24
Interestingly, an analysis of arbitration's core procedural principles
demonstrates a high degree of consistency with norms derived from other
areas of law. For example, Matti Kurkela and Hannes Snellman have
argued that non-derogable arbitral procedures constitute a "'hard' rule of
law" that bears a striking resemblance to certain basic constitutional
225principles of procedural fairness. Peter Rutledge has also found
evidence of an overlap between arbitration law and fundamental
procedural norms, claiming that "due process norms have seeped into
arbitration" through public policy provisions in various international
treaties and national arbitration laws.2 26 Sarah Cole and Richard Reuben,
writing in the domestic realm, have reached similar conclusions based on
a theory of shared state action, whereby judges are considered to have a
duty to apply constitutional standards of procedural fairness in arbitration
because the courts are intimately involved in overseeing, facilitating, and
22enforcing arbitration agreements.227 Analogous arguments can be made
in the international setting, given the role that national courts play in
recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and awards.2 28
Judges have also recognized a connection between arbitral and non-
arbitral norms. For example, Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom, has noted in various extrajudicial
statements that arbitrators have "a duty to act judicially" because they
41 229
"are participating in the rule of law" when they are deciding disputes.
222. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 24 (distinguishing between rules and principles);
Talmon, supra note 12, at 981.
223. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 37, at xii; see also supra notes 130-33 and
accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
225. KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 5, at 1.
226. PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 145-59 (2013).
227. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
3; Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 956-58 (2000). Some
controversy exists regarding the state action theory of arbitration, with courts often
finding no state action in arbitral matters. See Cole, supra, at 3-5 (discussing authorities).
228. See STRONG, supra note 102, at 31-32.
229. Lord Neuberger, President, Supreme Court of the U.K., London Address to
Property Arbitrators at the ARBRIX Annual Conference (Nov. 12, 2013),
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Lord Neuberger has also suggested that the obligation to act in
accordance with certain judicial standards is owed not only "to the
parties to the arbitration, but ... also ... to the public."2 30
Together, these statements support the notion that international
arbitration provides important insights into general principles of
procedural law. While an exclusive focus on international arbitration
would be inappropriate (because there may be some procedures that are
waivable in arbitration but not waivable in litigation), 23 1 arbitral
authorities provide a unique perspective on global consensus on
questions of procedure.
B. Conclusions About the Content of General Principles of
Procedural Law
Having established why international arbitration can and should be
considered an appropriate source from which to derive general principles
of procedural law, it is time to discuss what those principles are. When
Kotuby and Sobota conducted their analysis, they identified six general
principles of procedural law. According to their research, any process
seeking to provide a final and binding determination of a party's legal
rights must (1) provide notice to the parties and have jurisdiction over the
parties and the dispute in question; (2) protect the impartiality and
independence of the decision maker; (3) safeguard procedural equality
and the right to be heard; (4) preclude the possibility of fraud and
corruption; (5) allow the presentation of evidence and identify the
necessary burdens of proof; and (6) respect the principle of res
judicata.23 2
Kotuby and Sobota completed their work in 2017 and had the
advantage of recent advancements in international arbitration.2 33
However, their list is very similar to that generated by Cheng in 1953,
although Cheng described eight rather than six individual elements
(jurisdiction; power to determine the extent of jurisdiction (compdtence
de la comptence); nemo debet essejudex in propria sua causa; audiatur
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131112.pdf, see also Catherine A. Rogers,
The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 957, 985 n.97
(2005) (claiming "the product of international arbitral decision-making is justice").
230. Lord Neuberger, supra note 229.
231. See infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text (regarding waivers of class
proceedings).
232. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 157-202.
233. See id.; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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et altera pars; jura novit curia; proof and burden of proof; the principle
of res judicata; and extinctive prescription).234
The overlap between the two sets of conclusions supports the
veracity of their content because general principles of law are not
expected to change significantly over time.2 35 To the contrary, if a
general principle of law "expresses a general truth, which guides our
action, [and] serves as a theoretical basis for the various acts of our life,"
then one would expect a relatively high degree of consistency, even over
a period of many years. 23 6 Indeed, the Brownlie-Cheng test for general
principles of procedural law specifically stated that any norm that was to
be categorized as a general principle must endure over a sufficiently long
period of time.237
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW AND JUS COGENS
A. Definition ofJus Cogens and Its Relationship to Other Types of
International Law
As useful as Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota's conclusions are about the
content of general principles of procedural law and the means by which
those principles are derived, the analysis need not stop there.238 To the
contrary, it may be possible to go even further and argue that some or all
of the norms identified by Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota as constituting
international due process also reflect a type of procedural jus cogens.239
Although the concept of jus cogens has been recognized since at
least the mid-20th century, international lawyers continue to debate
whether and to what extent jus cogens actually exists in contemporary
practice. 24 0 Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the idea of
peremptory norms, which suggests it may be useful to consider the
234. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; see also id. at 257-58 (summarizing the
principles outlined in the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the Arakas (The
Georgios) Case from 1927). While Kotuby and Sobota considered Cheng's work when
undertaking their analysis, they did so with a critical eye and did not simply seek to
repeat Cheng's conclusions. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at xiii-xiv.
235. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202.
236. CHENG, supra note 20, at 24.
237. See BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 7-8; CHENG, supra note 20, at 24.
238. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 257-386; KoTuBy & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at
157-202.
239. See JAKSIC, supra note 54, at 218.
240. See Kadelbach, supra note 17, at 28 (stating that "the criteria which help to
identify jus cogens norms are not entirely clear" but noting that the concept ofjus cogens
existed prior to the Vienna Convention); see also Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16,
at 339 (suggesting that peremptory norms are rooted in customary international law).
390 [Vol. 122:2
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
nature and scope of what might be called procedural jus cogens.241
Indeed, as Georges Abi-Saab once said, even if the concept ofjus cogens
were an "empty box, the category [is] still useful; for without the box, it
cannot be filled." 24 2
Controversies about the practical application of jus cogens have not
stopped scholars from reaching consensus about the definition of the
term.243 At this point, the concept of jus cogens (sometimes referred to as
ius cogens or peremptory norms) is universally understood to mean a
tightly circumscribed set of non-derogable norms applicable to all states
and "include[s], at a minimum, the prohibitions against genocide; slavery
or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and 'the principles
of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force."'244 These
"norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory,
do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority." 2 45 As a result, "[f]us cogens
norms are often thought to be equivalent to constitutional principles of
international law, to an international bill of rights, or they are said to
constitute the highest in a norms hierarchy."246
This understanding is reflected in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties, which refers to "peremptory norm[s] of general
international law ('jus cogens')" and explicitly states that
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
241. See H6lne Ruiz Fabri, Enhancing the Rhetoric of Jus Cogens, 23 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1049, 1051-53 (2012); Thomas Kleinlein, Jus Cogens Re-Examined: Value Formalism
in International Law, 28 EuR. J. INT'L L. 295, 296 (2017); Alexander Orakhelashvili,
Peremptory Norms of the International Community: A Reply to William E. Conklin, 23
EUR. J. INT'L L. 863, 866-67 (2012); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 292 (2006).
242. Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 491, 491 (2008) (quoting Georges Abi-Saab, The Third World and the Future of the
International Legal Order, 29 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INT'L 27, 53 (1973)).
243. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 331-32; Shelton, supra note 241,
at 292.
244. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 331-32.
245. Id at 332.
246. MAY, supra note 51, at 121.
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which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. 247
Some questions may arise as to whether the concepts under
discussion here are better analyzed as a matter of jus cogens or as
obligations erga omnes, given the similarities between the two types of
norms. 24 8 Thomas Weatherall has explained the connection by noting that
"[t]he legal effects of jus cogens are actualized through obligations
arising from peremptory norms-obligations erga omnes-through
which a civil society function is conceived in international law." 2 4 9
However, he recognizes that "[fjunctionally, the classification erga
omnes denotes a general legal interest of all States as members of the
international community in the performance of these obligations."2 50
Thus, the two concepts-jus cogens and obligations erga omnes-are not
necessarily identical.
Conceptual difficulties can arise because jus cogens has at times
been defined as involving "rules whose effect [it] is to make conflicting
treaties void," which suggests that jus cogens operates primarily as a
conflict of laws provision.25 1 Additional problems arise to the extent that
obligations erga omnes "have been considered ... as a concept of State
responsibility," which. can sound as if they can affect individual rights
pursuant to contemporary notions about the duties owed by states to
individuals as a matter of public international law.252
However, obligations erga omnes have also been described as
"obligations towards the international community of States as a
247. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at art. 53. Although the United States has
signed the Vienna Convention, the instrument has not yet been ratified. Nevertheless,
several members of the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous lower federal courts have.
relied on the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 40 n.11 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The Second Circuit considers the Vienna Convention "'an authoritative
guide to the customary international law of treaties,' insofar as it reflects actual state
practices." Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore,
"[t]he Department of State considers the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties an
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Id.
248. Kadelbach, supra note 17, at 26-27 (noting jus cogens and obligations erga
omnes share a common core).
249. WEATHERALL, supra note 32, at 351
250. Id. at 352.
251. Kadelbach, supra note 17, at 26.
252. Id.; see also Nissel, supra note 32, at 823; Lucy Reed, Great Expectations:
Where Does the Proliferation of International Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave
International Law?, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 225 (2002) ("The traditional
concept of public international law as a regulator of exclusively state-to-state relations
has changed. Increasingly, public international law affects both the direct rights and
direct responsibilities of private actors, vis-A-vis both states and each other.").
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whole."253 While "the concept of jus cogens is [also] founded on
community interests," that principle is "characterized by the prohibition
[ofl disposing over certain rights, be it to one's own disadvantage or to
the detriment of others who are not in a position to provide effectively
for this protection themselves, such as peoples, groups or individuals."25 4
The language strongly suggests that jus cogens can be considered to
protect certain individual rights, even though some jus cogens norms
(such as self-determination) are not oriented toward individuals.2 55
Further support for this conclusion can be found in statements by
Alexander Orakhelashvili, who believes that there is merit to the
argument that all human rights, including rights concerning access to
justice and the nature of the civil litigation process, are part of jus
cogens. 256 In his opinion,
[s]ubstantive criteria to identify peremptory human rights are the same
as general criteria of identification of jus cogens: (1) whether a right
protects the community interest transcending the individual State
interests; [and] (2) whether the deroation from such right is prevented
by its non-bilateralizable character.
Although each right requires its own individualized analysis, it is
clear that human rights can fall within the realm of jus cogens.258 While
Orakhelashvili may go too far in suggesting that all human rights can be
considered jus cogens, the fact that some human rights may rise to the
level of peremptory norms demonstrates the validity of the current
analysis.
Given these features, as well as the fact that obligations erga omnes
have not been recognized as long as jus cogens, even at a theoretical
level, this Article will focus on jus cogens rather than obligations erga
omnes.2 59 Focusing on jus cogens also makes sense given the close
253. Kadelbach, supra note 17, at 35.
254. Id.
255. See ORAKHELASHVJLI, supra note 17, at 53 ("Most of the cases of jus cogens are
'cases where the position of the individual is involved."'); WEATHERALL, supra note 32,
at 444; Guan, supra note 17, at 496 ("[A] normative shift in jus cogens to conceiving of
them as the rights of the individual might not so much require an overhaul of the
international rights regime, as simply a reframing of the narrative."); Reed, supra note
252, at 225.
256. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 59-60; see also Christopher A.
Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access, 93 B.U. L. REv. 2033,
2035 (2013) ("Even if its precise contours are not entirely settled, the right to court access
is increasingly recognized in both international and domestic law.").
257. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 59.
258. See id.
259. See Kadelbach, supra note 17, at 27 (noting "[t]he Barcelona Traction case
which expressly refers to erga omnes obligations is often also cited as a reference for jus
cogens"); see also Niels Petersen, Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice-
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connection between jus cogens and general principles of law.260 Indeed,
one "popular theory of jus cogens asserts that peremptory norms enter
international law as 'general principles of law,"' thereby specifically
raising the question at issue here, namely whether and to what extent
certain general principles of procedural law can or should be recognized
as a type of proceduraljus cogens.261
As logical as this question may be, finding the answer is somewhat
challenging, given that jus cogens has traditionally been considered
through the lens of substantive rather than procedural law.262 This is not
to say that the concept of a procedural element of jus cogens is entirely
without support. To the contrary, a number of jurists have argued that
procedural norms can and should be included within the concept of jus
cogens to the extent those principles are necessary to give effect to
different substantive laws.263 Thus, Larry May has claimed that habeas
corpus rises to the level of procedural jus cogens,264 while other
commentators have suggested that state immunity constitutes a type of
proceduraljus cogens.265
Procedural jus cogens can also be justified on other grounds.266 For
example, Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have argued in favor of a
procedural element of jus cogens deriving from its connection to the rule
of law, suggesting that one of the "substantive criterion ofjus cogens ...
is a procedural principle regarding the rule of law: a norm will count as
jus cogens if respect for it is indispensable to the state's ability to secure
legality for the benefit of all." 26 7 Support for this type of procedural jus
cogens could be found in discussions regarding the use of universal
jurisdiction.26 8
Factors of Success, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1295, 1311 (2011) (noting the Barcelona Traction
case, which arose in 1970, contains a procedural element).
260. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 341; Shelton, supra note 241, at
299 (discussing the seminal work of Alfred Verdross).
261. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 341; see also WEATHERALL, supra note
32, at 129.
262. See BROWNLIE, supra note 128, at 510-12.
263. See MAY, supra note 51, at 120 (discussing habeas corpus); Knuchel, supra note
12, at 154-56.
264. See MAY, supra note 51, at 120 (discussing habeas corpus).
265. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 340-59; Knuchel, supra note 12, at
154-56; Orakhelashvili, supra note 12, at 89-90; Talmon, supra note 12, at 984, 987-
1001.
266. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 367
267. Id. (discussing the work of Thomas Hobbes and Lon Fuller).
268. Although the concept of universal jurisdiction remains somewhat controversial
and is primarily discussed in the context of international criminal law, there are those
who have suggested the existence or development of a type of universal civil jurisdiction.
See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal
Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142 (2006); Mdximo Langer, The Diplomacy
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Another way of considering the propriety of procedural jus cogens
is through an analysis of the way that jus cogens develops. For example,
Criddle and Fox-Decent have argued that jus cogens norms can "enter
international law as 'general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations,"' which means that "[t]hese general principles may include
procedural maxims such as pacta sunt servanda . . . as well as basic
individual rights enshrined in municipal constitutions, statutes, and
judicial decisions."26 9 While Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota characterize
pacta sunt servanda in substantive rather than procedural terms, the
underlying premise remains valid: Those procedural protections that can
be considered general principles of law might, in proper circumstances,
rise to the level of jus cogens.2 70
This is not to say that all authorities support the notion of
procedural jus cogens. For example, some judicial opinions suggest that
"due process guarantees and the right to a fair trial" are "derogable,"2 71
even though numerous experts have argued that "due process" rises to
the level of a peremptory norm.2 72 While this apparent paradox may
relate to a difference of opinion in terms of what is or should be included
within the ambit of procedural jus cogens, other explanations exist.2 7 3 For
example, it is at least equally possible that those who frame due process
rights as being derogable are simply failing to distinguish between rights
that are waivable by the parties (such as the right to an appeal or a fully
reasoned decision) and rights that are not waivable (such as the audiatur
principle).274 Alternatively, it may be that certain rights (such as notice)
of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of
International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 n.4, 48 (2011); Ariel Zemach, Reconciling
Universal Jurisdiction with Equality Before the Law, 47 TEx. INT'L L.J. 143, 145 (2011).
269. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 341.
270. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 112-14; KoTuBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 89-
101.
271. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 371 n.144 (quoting Michael Byers,
Alexander Orakhelashvili's Peremptory Norms in International Law, 101 AM. J. INT'L L.
913, 916 (2007) (book review)); see also Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11
(1972); Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); supra note 146-
47 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural trinity).
272. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 370-71; see also
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 60 ("[C]ertain 'derogable' rights can be peremptory.
This is clear with regard to due process guarantees and the right to fair trial . . . ."); Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 44
n.253 (2005).
273. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
trinity).
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may be non-derogable by the state (i.e., peremptory) but may be
waivable by the parties in proper circumstances. 2 75
This latter possibility demonstrates why it is so important to include
arbitral authorities in discussions about procedural aspects of public
international law. Not only does international arbitration provide
important insights into general principles of procedural law (which are
intimately linked with procedural jus cogens), it also captures -the
distinction between waivable and non-waivable procedural rights in a
way that other areas of law do not.27 6
At this point, the most detailed discussion about waivable
procedural rights involves large-scale arbitration, meaning three different
types of proceedings known as class arbitration, mass arbitration, and
collective arbitration.2 77 Waivers of the ability to proceed as a group have
not only been successfully imposed in U.S.-style class arbitrations,278
they have also been sought (thus far unsuccessfully) in the context of
investment proceedings. 2 79 However, arbitration gives rise to a number of
275. See Strong, supra note 81, at 19. While some fundamental procedural
protections (such as notice) may be waivable in certain circumstances, states will
scrutinize those choices in some detail. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11; Nat'l Equip. Rental,
375 U.S. at 315-16; Noyes, supra note 82, at 596-97; Thornburg, supra note 82, at 209-
10 (discussing criteria that might govern procedural autonomy).
276. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 17, at 59 ("[C]ategorization of rights into
derogable and non-derogable is not the same as dividing human rights norms into jus
cogens and jus dispositivum."); Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 341.
277. Class and collective arbitration can arise domestically or internationally,
whereas mass arbitration only exists in international investment cases. See STRONG, supra
note 83, at 205-22, 249-53 (discussing waivers of class arbitration, including in cases
involving international parties).
278. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). This issue is coming
before the U.S. Supreme Court again. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d
975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). A recent rule
issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Board precluding the use of class waivers in
certain types of consumer arbitration suggests that debate about large-scale arbitration
will continue for the foreseeable future. See generally Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed.
Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
279. See S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration: Wa(i)ve of the
Future?, 29 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 690 (2014) (discussing attempted waivers
of mass arbitration in investment contracts); S.I. Strong, Limits of Autonomy in
International Investment Arbitration: Are Contractual Waivers of Mass Procedures
Enforceable?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2013 141 passim (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2015)
(discussing possible waivers in investment treaties).
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other types of procedural waivers, and those analyses could prove useful
to the analysis of proceduraljus cogens.280
Valuable insights could also be derived from an examination of the
structure of international arbitration. Although most structural analyses
focus on the concept of consent, all three types of international
arbitration (i.e., interstate, international commercial, and investor-state)
require an explicit grant of jurisdiction from the state(s) in question
before individual proceedings may begin. 28 1 This formal connection
between arbitration and the state suggests that it would be impossible for
states to sidestep their obligations to comply with procedural jus cogens
simply by allowing disputes to be decided by private, non-governmental
actors.282 The principle is essentially one of vicarious liability: States
cannot allow procedural injustice to arise, even if that injustice arises at
the hands of a neutral, non-governmental arbitrator, just as employers
cannot avoid liability for certain non-derogable acts simply by hiring an
independent contractor to undertake the activity in question.28 3
These structural elements also correlate to tests relating to the
development of jus cogens. For example, Criddle and Fox-Decent have
argued that "[t]he leading positivist theory of jus cogens conceives of
280. See, e.g., RUTLEDGE, supra note 226, at 170 (discussing the right to a jury trial);
Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 761, 762-64 (2012)
(discussing various procedural protections).
281. See Strong, supra note 25, at 331-50. Other areas of private international law
experience similar issues. See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 66
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 48 (2006) (noting the characterization of "private international law
as a matter of State discretion").
282. See MAY, supra note 51, at 121; Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 332;
Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 366, 368 (1986) ("Any
alternative to the trial must respect relevant legal and institutional constraints . . . ."); see
also Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 53.
283. This principle exists in numerous state laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 58-60 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (discussing U.S.
law); S.I. STRONG & Liz WiLLIAMS, COMPLETE TORT LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 2011) (discussing English law). Similar situations exist at the international level.
For example, a state would not appear capable of absolving itself from the duty to prevent
genocide or torture simply by delegating peace-keeping and interrogation duties to
private companies, although some problems have arisen when domestic courts are unable
or unwilling to address these types of concerns. See Kiobel v. Dutch Royal Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117-18 (2013) (limiting the applicability of the U.S. Alien Tort
Statute). But see Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661, 665-66 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying
action under Alien Tort Statute but allowing an action to proceed under jus cogens and
the U.S. Torture Victims Protection Act), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2280 (2017); H. John
Goodell, Using the Threat of the International Criminal Court to Encourage Congress to
Pass the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 14 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 261, 262
(2011) (discussing the Blackwater prosecutions); Krzysztof Kotarski, Chapter 14
Privatizing Humanitarian Intervention? Mercenaries, PMCs and the Business ofPeace, 7
IUS GENTIUM 239, 240-41 (2011).
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peremptory norms as customary law that has attained peremptory status
through state practice and opinio juris."284 However, Criddle and Fox-
Decent argue that positivist theories of jus cogens are somewhat
unstable, leading "some scholars [to suggest] that the requirement of
state consent might be satisfied if a representative supermajority of states
accepted an emerging norm as peremptory." 2 85 Under this latter
approach, which appears consistent with the views of the United
Nation's International Law Commission,
Peremptory norms need not achieve universal acceptance to create a
binding international consensus ... ; instead, international norms may
claim a consensus of "the international community of States as a
whole" if a "very large majority" of representative states accept the
norms as nonderogable. Circumventing actual state practice, advocates
of this consensus theory typically presume that states signal their
consent to peremptory norms through a variety of expressive acts ....
Consensus theory thus envisions a new, autonomous mode of general
international law formation-a quasi-customary source that is not
beholden to state practice or individualized state consent.286
Although detailed analysis of this and other developmental tests for
jus cogens is beyond the scope of this Article, the overwhelming state
acceptance of various treaties on international arbitration 28 7 and the
strong cross-border consensus on fundamental and non-derogable
procedural norms in international arbitration suggests that some arbitral
principles do in fact rise to the level of procedural jus cogens.288 This
conclusion is not diminished in any way by arguments that international
arbitration is controlled by a small cadre of industry "insiders," because
the various procedural norms are effectively ratified by states through
adherence to the relevant treaties and through judicial interpretations of
289treaty norms that are highly consistent across 'national borders.
Concerns about a Westernized bias in international arbitration appear
284. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 339; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 n.6 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987)
(claiming that jus cogens "is now widely accepted ... as a principle of customary
[international] law (albeit of higher status)").
285. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 34L
286. Id. at 341-42 (footnote omitted).
287. For example, the New York Convention has been adopted by 157 out of
approximately 195 countries in the world. See New York Convention Status, supra note
34.
288. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text. International arbitration has
long been criticized as an "insider's club." See Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity
Challenge: Exploring the "Invisible College" of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 467-68 (2015).
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equally unavailing given the rate at which Asian, African, and Middle
Eastern jurisdictions have embraced international arbitration.2 90
B. General Principles ofProcedural Law As A Type ofProcedural
Jus Cogens
The preceding discussion not only suggests that procedural jus
cogens does in fact exist, it also demonstrates how important it is to rely
on arbitral norms when developing the content of jus cogens. However, it
is still unclear what norms might constitute procedural jus cogens.
Although a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the
current Article, it is nevertheless useful to consider whether, and to what
extent, the general principles of procedural law identified by Cheng,
Kotuby, and Sobota could rise to the level of procedural jus cogens, at
least as a preliminary matter.2 91 The discussion focuses on the list
generated by Kotuby and Sobota because they not only considered
Cheng's work in detail but also incorporated over 60 years' worth of
additional materials into their analysis.29 2
In undertaking this analysis, it is critical to appreciate that this is
merely the first step in the process of identifying the content of
procedural jus cogens.293 For example, some types of substantive jus
cogens norms, such as the prohibition on state aggression, are not
reflected in municipal law, suggesting that some gaps could arise in any
290. International arbitration is often characterized as a blend of common law and
civil law procedures, which could lead to objections that other legal traditions-such as
those involving Islamic and chthonic law-are not reflected in international arbitral
norms. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2128. However, that argument does not appear to
hold much weight, given the number of non-Western nations that have adopted the New
York Convention and the Model Arbitration Law and the flourishing of international
arbitral institutions in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. See New York Convention
Status, supra note 34; UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law Status, supra note 95; 1 BORN,
supra note 3, at 191-99; Nabil N. Antaki, Cultural Diversity and ADR Practices in the
World, in ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS CULTURES 265, 269 (Jean-
Claude Goldsmith et al. eds., 2006); Natasha Bakirci et al., Arbitration in the Dubai
International Financial Center, 7 INT'L J. ARAB ARB. 5, 5 (2015); David Butler, The
State of International Commercial Arbitration in Southern Africa: Tangible Yet
Tantalizing Progress, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 169, 169-70 (2004); Nicholas Wiegand, Can Asia
Cut the Costs?, 34 J. INT'L ARB. 401, 401 (2017). Furthermore, the availability of
international arbitration does not preclude the use of mediation and conciliation, which
are often said (rightly or wrongly) to be more consistent with non-European dispute
resolution practices and values. See Antaki, supra, at 269-70 (noting the ability to
sequentialize different dispute resolution processes).
291. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 371 (suggesting such a conclusion
is "emerging" but claiming that "due process demands in a particular proceeding will turn
upon contextual factors").
292. See generally CHENG, supra note 20 (writing in 1953); KOTUBY & SOBOTA,
supra note 23 (writing in 2017).
293. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 158-60.
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type of procedural jus cogens that is based entirely on municipal law, as
is the case here. As intriguing as this phenomenon is, it need not impede
the current study, which does not seek to provide a comprehensive list of
all procedural jus cogens norms. To the contrary, this observation
suggests that more, not less, work is needed in the area of international
procedural law.
The first of Kotuby and Sobota's general principles of procedural
law involves notice and jurisdiction, meaning that the decision maker (be
it a court or an arbitral tribunal) must have jurisdiction over the parties
and the dispute, and the parties must have adequate notice of the
proceedings.29 4 While arguments can arise about what constitutes
"proper" jurisdiction and "proper" notice, the fundamental concept
appears incontrovertible: Jurisdiction and notice must exist if the
resulting decision is to be considered legitimate.295 Indeed, as Solum has
said,
procedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea
that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an,
essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal
norms. Meaningful participation requires notice and opportunity to be
heard, and it requires a reasonable balance between cost and
296
accuracy.
Classifying the need for jurisdiction and notice as a type of
procedural jus cogens is further supported by Criddle and Fox-Decent's
claim that "a norm will count as jus cogens if respect for it is
indispensable to the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of
all."297
The second concept identified by Kotuby and Sobota as a general
principle of procedural law involves the impartiality and independence of
the decision maker.2 98 This principle has been extensively discussed in
both arbitral 299 and judicial settings3 00 and is central to the legitimacy of
the dispute resolution process. 301 Interestingly, one of the reasons why
international arbitration has become so popular in recent years is because
294. See id.
295. See Solum, supra note 8, at 183.
296. Id.
297. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 367.
298. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 165-76.
299. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 1828; see also INT'L BAR ASS'N, supra note 206.
300. See THE BURGH HouSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 205; Joseph R. Brubaker, The
Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International Adjudication, 26 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 111, 115-16 (2008); Edward Gordon et al., The Independence and Impartiality
ofInternational Judges, 83 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 508, 508 (1989).
301. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 1828; THE BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note
205; Brubaker, supra note 300, at 115-16; Gordon et al., supra note 300, at 508.
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the use of independent, non-state tribunals eliminates longstanding
concerns about actual or potential bias on the part of national courts in
cases where the state is sued by foreign investors or where one of the
parties is a foreign national.302 The empirically proven rise in the use of
international arbitration in the last few decadeS 303 underscores the
conclusion that independence and impartiality of decision makers not
only constitutes a general principle of procedural law but also reflects a
peremptory norm that "is indispensable to the state's ability to secure
legality for the benefit of all."30
The third element discussed by Kotuby and Sobota involves
procedural equality and the right to be heard.305 While some
commentators have found it difficult to distinguish between these two
concepts at the level of individual rules,3 06 the overwhelming success of
international arbitration is a testament to the ability of states and parties
to agree on certain fundamental norms as a matter of principle.30 7
Furthermore, there seems to be little, if any, scope for arguing that
procedural equality and the right to be heard are not "indispensable to the
state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of all." 3 08 As a result, these
norms can be said to rise to the level of procedural jus cogens.
The fourth general principle identified by Kotuby and Sobota
involves the condemnation of fraud and corruption. 3 09 In some ways,
these principles appear to relate more to substantive concerns than
procedural issues, given that many of Kotuby and Sobota's examples
involve the duty of judicial and arbitral tribunals not to give effect to
agreements or actions that are fraudulent or corrupt. 3 10 However, it may
302. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 81 (discussing popularity of international
arbitration); Marie-France Houde, Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment
Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 2006 143, 144 (2006); Valentina
Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67, 97 (2010).
303. See Joachim Pohl et al., Dispute Settlement Provisions in International
Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey 23 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
Working Paper on International Investment No. 02, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
5k8xb71nf628-en.
304. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 367.
305. See KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 176-83.
306. See Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 133, 136-37 (2008) (reviewing OscAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2007)) ("[C]ivil procedure is seen as peculiarly tied to local
culture and social heritage in a way that resists change . . . ."). International initiatives
such as the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and the European Rules of Civil Procedure
suggest that consensus is possible, given sufficient political will. See ALI & UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES, supra note 148.
307. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 93-97.
308. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 367.
309. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 183-90.
310. Id.
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be that Kotuby and Sobota were thinking about efforts to perpetuate a
fraud on the judicial or arbitral process, as in situations where parties or
third parties seek to intimidate arbitrators or judges.3 11 While this latter
category of concerns does appear to be procedural in nature, those
matters could just as easily be included in provisos regarding the
independence and impartiality of decision makers.312 Therefore, it does
not appear that concerns about fraud and corruption can or should be
characterized as independent procedural principles rising to the level of
peremptory norms, although further analysis could lead to a contrary
conclusion.
The fifth principle identified by Kotuby and Sobota involves
evidence and burdens of proof. 313 While the authors are to be
commended for trying to unbundle the constituent elements of procedure,
even they recognize that some of the items under this heading could fall
into other categories.314 For example, the failure to allow parties to
present evidence could very easily be subsumed within the more general
right to be heard, as could concern about improperly or illegally obtained
evidence.315 However, other issues discussed by Kotuby and Sobota in
this section do not appear to fall within the general right to be heard.316
For example, questions about burdens of production and proof, as well as
matters involving the weight of evidence, appear to be better categorized
as rules rather than core principles of procedural justice, given the
significant amount of variation between jurisdictions on how these norms
operate.3 17 For example, many lawyers, particularly those who come
from the civil law tradition, do not view the production of evidence (i.e.,
discovery) to be fundamental to procedural justice, because shifting
burdens of proof and negative inferences achieve the same end.318
311. Statistics are difficult to establish, but anecdotal reports suggest that judges and
arbitrators are in fact the subject of intimidation efforts. See, e.g., GUnther J. Horvath et
al., Categories of Guerilla Tactics, in GUERILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION § 1.02[B][2] (Giinther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013); Abba
Kolo, Witness Intimidation, Tampering and Other Related Abuses of Process in
Investment Arbitration: Possible Remedies Available to the Arbitral Tribunal, 26 ARB.
INT'L 43, pt. 1(a) (2010) (noting intimidation of witnesses is more frequent than
intimidation of arbitrators); Judges Targeted Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:04 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/judges-targeted-fast-facts/ (listing federal judges who
have been threatened or killed as a result of their work).
312. See KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 165-76; see also supra notes 298-304
and accompanying text.
313. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 190-96.
314. See id. at 197.
315. See id. at 196.
316. See id. at 191-95; see also supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
317. See KoTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 191-95.
318. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2311-15; El Ahdab & Amal Bouchenaki,
Discovery in International Arbitration: A Foreign Creature for Civil Lawyers?, in
402 [Vol. 122:2
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL LAW
Common law lawyers, of course, find such views anathema.3 19 While
functional alternatives can be identified in individual cases (as occurs
routinely in international arbitration, which blends common law and civil
law procedures),320 these features do not seem to rise to the level of
procedural jus cogens norms, although some constituent elements (such
as the right to present evidence) could be considered peremptory norms
to the extent they fall within protected categories like the right to be
heard.3 21
The final principle discussed by Kotuby and Sobota involves the
concept of res judicata, which they define as meaning that (1) parties are
bound by properly rendered judgments and awards and (2) claims cannot
be retried a second time by the same court or tribunal.3 22 While scholars
and states may differ about what precisely is meant by res judicata (for
example, some debate exists about how appeals relate to the concept of
finality), all authorities agree that the core concept reflects an undisputed
general principle of law that is "nonoptional."3 23 As a result, the notion of
res judicata can be said to rise to the level of procedural jus cogens.
V. CONCLUSION
According to numerous longstanding scholarly and judicial
narratives, procedural law exists merely "to serve the substantive task,"
thereby implying not only that procedural law is secondary to substantive
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES (INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS SERIES No. 15) 65, 78-80 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 2011); Strong, supra note 25, at 365.
319. For example, Michael Bayles claims:
The common-law principle of an opportunity to be heard has typically been
taken to include rights (1) to adequate notice, (2) to pre-hearing discovery, (3)
to an adjournment, (4) to present evidence, (5) to rebut evidence and often to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, (6) to a copy of the transcript, and (8) [sic] to
reasons for a decision.
MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIvIDuALS 40 (1990).
Common law reliance on cross-examination has been imported into international
arbitration, although other common law procedures-most notably, discovery-find only
limited application. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2126-27.
320. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2128.
321. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
322. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 197-202.
323. Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata as Requisite for Justice, 68 RUTGERS U. L.
REv. 1067, 1082 (2016). Kevin Clermont explains:
In sum, based on observation of comparative laws and based on theory of
adjudication, the essential core of res judicata is nonoptional. Still, I am not
arguing a universal value that demands a minimal amount of content in res
judicata law, but rather a universal institutional need for a minimal amount.
Id. Readers from the United States need to exercise some care, because the United States
embraces perhaps the most extreme version of the res judicata principle in the world. See
id at 1069-70 (discussing American exceptionalism in procedural law).
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324law but also that procedural law is inherently instrumental in nature.
However, that paradigm is not quite accurate. Although substance and
procedure are inextricably linked, procedural law is inherently and
intrinsically valuable and provides important limitations on state
behavior.325
The centrality of procedural law to the proper functioning of civil
society creates a heightened need to understand the essential nature of
core procedural norms. Recognizing this need, academics have
considered procedural issues from a number of different perspectives,
including legitimacy theory,326 procedural justice,327 constitutional and
international due process,32 8 the rule of law,32 9 and human rights.33 0
Although these analyses are in many ways useful, the diversity of
approaches can inhibit the development of overarching theories or
general principles of procedural law.331
The situation is particularly problematic in the international realm.
Although recent years have seen increasing interest in cross-border
procedure at the regional level, there remains a dearth of material
concerning international procedural law.332 This phenomenon could be
explained in a variety of ways, ranging from the perceived priority of
substantive law over. procedural, law to the supposed parochialism of
324. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 567 (1965).
325. See John B. Attanasio, A Duty-Oriented Procedure in a Rights-Oriented Society,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 605-607 (1988); Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of
International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 77, 82-83 (2009).
326. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting
Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1049, 1060 (2012); Nienke Grossman,
The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 104 (2013);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2600 (1997).
327. See Desierto, supra note 31, at 948; Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The
Public in the Private ofArbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure ofRights, 124
YALE L.J. 2804, 2806-07 (2015).
328. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 547; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 5, at
1321-22.
329. See Bergholtz, supra note 146, at 44.
330. See ACHR, supra note 65, at art. 8, para. 1; ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 14;
European Convention, supra note 65, at art. 6; Universal Declaration, supra note 65, at
art. 10.
331. See Bone, supra note 8, at 487-88; Solum, supra note 8, at 182-83.
332. European private international law, including questions of procedure, has
become something of a hot topic. See ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
ENGLISH COURTS 17-22 (2014); Marise Cremona & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in
PRIVATE LAW IN THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EU 1, 4-5 (Marise Cremona & Hans-
W. Micklitz eds., 2016). See generally GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: EUROPEAN AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2017); THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND NATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Anna Nylund & Bart Krans eds.,
2016).
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procedural law and the lack of qualified comparatists. 33 3 Commentators
have also suggested that the fragmentation of international adjudication
into separate "silos" (such as those involving the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, etc.) has made overarching analysis
difficult or inappropriate.33 4 While these factors may indeed contribute to
the scarcity of academic research involving international procedural law,
another explanation exists.
As the preceding pages have indicated, international arbitration has
expanded at a phenomenal rate over the last few decades.335 Arbitration
now dominates the field of international dispute resolution and, as a
procedural specialty, diverts scholarly resources from questions of
international judicial procedure. In other words, the functional
importance of arbitration as the de facto means of resolving international
disputes has very likely skewed academic output away from international
procedural law and toward international arbitration law. This conclusion
appears incontrovertible, given the massive amount of scholarly writing
on international arbitration that is generated each year. 3 36 While some of
these resources are aimed at practitioners, the field includes an
increasingly wide range of highly sophisticated empirical, theoretical,
and interdisciplinary works.337
Although international arbitration may be part of the problem, it
may also be part of the solution.3 3 8 For example, as the methodological
aspects of this Article have shown, international arbitration provides an
important and unique perspective on the content of general principles of
procedural law.339 Without arbitral source materials, inquiries into
international procedural norms would be incomplete at best and incorrect
at worst.
As important as questions of methodology may be, this Article has
not limited itself to those particular issues. Instead, this discussion has
also considered whether and to what extent certain general principles of
333. See Clermont, supra note 9, at 530; Langbein, supra note 9, at 546; Marcus,
supra note 9, at 709.
334. See Natasha A. Affolder, Tadi6, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of
International Procedural Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 495 (1998); Chester Brown, The
Cross-Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and Remedies in the
Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, 30 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 219, 221 (2008); Cohen, supra note 326, at 1050.
335. See 1 BORN, supra note 3, at 122.
336. See STRONG, supra note 89, at 71-137 (providing bibliographic information).
337. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2-
3 (2010); Strong, supra note 39 (providing sources of empirical and interdisciplinary
research).
338. See supra Parts II-III.
339. See supra Parts II-III.
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procedural law can be considered to reflect a type of procedural jus
cogens. At this point, the concept of jus cogens is somewhat
controversial and is arguably limited to certain substantive norms, which
raises questions about whether and to what extent it is necessary or
appropriate to discuss the development of procedural jus cogens.340
While those concerns are valid, this Article adopts the view of Georges
Abi-Saab that even if the concept of jus cogens were nothing more than
an "empty box, the category [is] still useful; for without the box, it
cannot be filled."3 4 1 Indeed, a simple hypothetical based on substantive
law demonstrates why it is helpful, if not necessary, to begin to develop
an understanding of proceduraljus cogens.
Currently, one of the core features of jus cogens is the prohibition
342
on torture. Some people might claim that recognition of a peremptory
norm on torture is unnecessary, given the large number of countries,
including the United States, that preclude such practices as a matter of
domestic and international law.343 While that might be true in a perfect
world, the current U.S. administration has made a number of statements
indicating an interest in using torture as an interrogation device, a
technique that, if adopted, would violate the United States' international
obligations, including those arising under the Universal Declaration, the
ICCPR, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment.344
Skeptics may believe that such an event would never actually occur
or that the courts would stop such practices even if they were attempted.
However, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, U.S. judges would be
capable of doing so, given various questions about the applicability of
those instruments in U.S. courts. 3 45 While detailed discussion of the
340. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 332.
341. See Bianchi, supra note 242, at 491.
342. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 331-32.
343. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; ICCPR, supra
note 65, at art. 7.
344. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 343, at art. 2; ICCPR, supra note
65, at art. 7; Universal Declaration, supra note 65, at art. 5; Adam Serwer, Can Trump
Bring Back Torture?, ATL. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/01/trump-torture/514463/.
345. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 343; ICCPR, supra note 65; United
States v. Casaran-Rivas, 311 F. App'x 269, 272 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the
Convention Against Torture is "not self-executing, or subject to relevant legislation, and,
therefore, do[es] not confer upon aliens a private right of action to allege a violation of
[its] terms"); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding
that the ICCPR is not self-executing and refusing to recognize "a private right of action
or separate form of relief enforceable in United States courts"); Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257 n.35 (2d Cir. 2003); 136 CONG. REc. S17,486-01 (Oct. 27,
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ramifications of a breach of substantive or procedural jus cogens is
beyond the scope of the current Article, jus cogens could provide several
possible responses to any attempt to use torture as an interrogation
device.346 For example, the violation of a jus cogens norm could allow
third states to undertake various countermeasures permitted under
international law or trigger actions for damages in foreign courts. 347
Although a common understanding of procedural jus cogens has not
yet developed, a need for such a concept does appear to exist, based on
recent developments in the United States and elsewhere. 34 8 For example,
in 2005, England statutorily reversed an 800-year-old prohibition on
double jeopardy to allow those who have been acquitted of a crime to be
tried again, with Scotland following suit in 2011.349 While these laws
only apply to criminal actions, a subject not considered in this Article or
in analyses conducted by Cheng, Kotuby, and Sobota,350 prohibitions on
double jeopardy are similar to the concept of res judicata in civil
proceedings. 35 1 Because criminal procedure has traditionally been subject
to more protection than civil procedure,352 any derogation of criminal law
standards raises concerns about whether political expediency could
trigger similar initiatives in civil settings.353 Indeed, recent events in the
1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701 n.6 (Am. Law. Inst. 1987) ("The binding character of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights continues to be debated. . . ."); Oona A. Hathaway et al., International
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 51, 65 (2012).
346. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 241, at 867 ("The principal effect of jus cogens
is consequentially to deny the rights, privileges, and qualifications the relevant state
action would command but for the peremptory status of the rule that the conduct in
question violates. It is precisely the underlying community interest that leads to that
result.").
347. See Thomas Giegerich, Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens
Violations Override State Immunity From the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 17, at 203, 203;
Christian Hillgruber, The Right of Third States to Take Countermeasures, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 17, at 265, 265.
348. The current administration's attacks on the judiciary have caused numerous
concerns about the future of U.S. judicial processes. See, e.g., Amy B. Wang, Trump
Lashes Out at 'So-Called Judge' Who Temporarily Blocked Travel Ban, WASH. POST
(Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-
lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/?utm term-
.722bl8158d63.
349. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 75 (Eng. & Wales); Double Jeopardy
(Scotland) Act 2011, (ASP 16) §§ 1-4; Double Jeopardy Law Ushered Out, supra note
19.
350. See supra note 51.
351. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 51, 74 and accompanying text.
353. Political expediency has been used to explain or justify a wide range of
procedural due process violations. See, e.g., Herzig, supra note 18, at 687-88; Larson &
Mehrotra, supra note 18; Volz & Anker, supra note 18, at 1.
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United States have raised significant questions about whether
immigration hearings (which are a type of civil proceeding) are
complying with various procedural standards. 54 These issues appear
likely to arise again, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trump
v. International Refugee Assistance Project.355
These and other developments strongly suggest an increasing need
to identify minimum standards of procedural justice in national and
international proceedings.356 Past initiatives have experienced difficulties
due to an inappropriate focus on rules rather than on principles, which
has resulted in a widespread belief that procedural law is too exceptional
and too closely tied to national legal systems to generate true cross-
border consensus.35 7 However, this Article has shown that a great deal of
commonality exists if the analysis focuses on general principles of law
rather than on individual rules and if the research considers materials
generated in international arbitration.358
Although this Article has broken new ground in the area of
international procedural law, further research is needed. For example,
considerable benefit could be derived from a detailed comparison of
contemporary work on general principles of procedural law and Cheng's
original text to see whether and to what extent the international
understanding of various procedural principles has changed over time. 5
Helpful insights could also be gained through an in-depth analysis of a
"draft code of general principles of law" created by Cheng.3 60
Additional research might focus on how general principles of
procedural law can or should be used by judges in practice. For example,
[i]n interpreting its constituent instruments must an international
tribunal apply international standards of procedural fairness or may it
modify these standards based on its context? What are the relevant
354. See Larson & Mehrotra, supra note 18; Volz & Anker, supra note 18, at 1.
Immigration proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal in nature and must
comply with traditional standards of due process. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A.
2011); In re M-D-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 542 (B.I.A. 2002) (citing Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982)).
355. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
356. See generally Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99 (Feb. 3).
357. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 24 (distinguishing rules from principles); Talmon,
supra note 12, at 981.
358. See 2 BORN, supra note 3, at 2126-27.
359. Although Kotuby and Sobota undertake a detailed analysis of general principles
of procedural law, other analyses of interest do exist. See BROWN, supra note 32; CHENG,
supra note 20, at 257-386; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 23, at 157-202; Francioni,
supra note 46, at 1-2.
360. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 379-99, app. 1.
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standards of procedural fairness to be applied by an international
tribunal? Can general principles of law be used both as a gap-filling
device and as an interpretative device on procedural questions?
Similar questions exist with respect to national court proceedings.
For instance, are domestic judges bound by peremptory norms of
procedure? If so, how do those norms arise? What elements are included
within those norms and can any analogies be drawn between
international criminal procedure and international civil procedure? 362
Additional research could also focus on procedural jus cogens. For
example, scholars might give further consideration to the scope of
procedural jus cogens and the connection between procedural jus cogens
and general principles of procedural law.
These are only a few suggestions on how scholarship in the field of
international procedural law might develop. Doubtless there are other
important issues that can and should be addressed. Hopefully, the current
Article has provided a useful foundation for further studies into this vital
and engaging subject.
361. Affolder, supra note 334, at 495.
362. Some material exists on how international law affects criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., MAY, supra note 51, at 1-17.
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